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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the effect of water scarcity in the Middle East on political stability at the 
local, regional and global scale. Guided by a comprehensive Conceptual Framework encompassing 
theories and concepts of scales, national- human- and environmental security, the thesis is 
structured as a multiscale case study of Syria. The analyses each present a narrative about water 
scarcity and political stability specific to their scale. As such, it is established how water scarcity in 
the Middle East and poor governance on behalf of the Syrian government lead to insecurity, 
migration and conflict within Syria. Furthermore, it is established how the lack of transnational 
cooperation on water issues is further exacerbating Syrian water scarcity, as well as how spillover 
from the Syrian crisis is creating insecurity in other places. It is argued that an environment of 
human security is difficult to obtain when national security is prioritized over human security. 
However the international community is largely relying on the former when responding to 
perceived threats. Conclusively, water scarcity can have a destabilizing impact by creating 
displacement, insecurity and conflict across multiple scales. 
Clarification of terms 
Migrant and Refugee 
The terms “migrant” and “refugee” are used somewhat interchangeably in this thesis to insure that 
the language of this thesis remained varied and interesting. Furthermore, Ibrahim Sirkeci, a scholar 
within the field of human security, argues that these terms are often used more as legislative labels 
and are thus not accurately represent correct notions of the patterns of people’s migration (Sirkeci, 
2009: 7). 
 
International Society/System 
The terms “International System”, “-society” and “-community” are used interchangeably, to 
describe the constellation of all the nation-states of the world. This is done to ensure readability 
throughout the thesis. 
 
The Syrian Government 
This thesis occasionally refers to the Syrian government, -regime, -authorities etc. These terms used 
interchangeably to describe the same actor, namely the government of the Syrian Arab Republic. 
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Introduction 
The world is currently witnessing a historic number of displaced people. The latest Global Trends 
report from the United Nation High Commission of Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that more than 
60 million people have been forced to leave their homes (UNHCR, 2014a: 2). 
One reason is a number of high-level humanitarian emergencies, such as the ongoing civil war in 
Syria, which has sent more than half the population looking for security elsewhere. Most of these 
people are displaced within Syria but increasingly they are crossing into neighboring countries 
(UNHCR, 2014b: 97). However the protracted nature of the conflict, combined with rising tension 
in the region means that many are now seeking refuge and safety in Europe or other parts of the 
world. These countries of transit or destination are struggling to find suitable ways to respond to the 
large influx of people. 
 
Violent conflict is however not the sole motivation for migration. Slow and rapid-onset natural 
hazards are rendering many people insecure across the world, for example through droughts, rising 
sea levels and increasing natural disasters. In fact water is one of the fundamental building blocks in 
all life; it is the most basic and universal requirement for life to thrive. Historically, easy access to 
freshwater has been a deciding factor in the movement of human social groups. If water is either 
scarce or abundant, people risk losing their livelihoods which may force or motivate many to 
migrate. A growing number of scholars, aid agencies, national and international, governmental and 
non-governmental organization have started to report on the links between changes in the 
environment, migration and conflict (Gleditsch, 2009; Sirkeci, 2009; Dalby, 2009). Whether these 
changes in the environment are caused by global processes of climate change or more local patterns 
of poor management of resources are debatable. 
 
This thesis argues that it is most likely a mix of processes and patterns operating on different scales 
and intersecting in numerous ways. Regardless, these changes are affecting the environment of 
security for a large number of people. Especially in less developed areas of the world, where these 
changes are often felt the most and where people are less resilient towards these changes (Dalby, 
2009; Sirkeci, 2009). 
 
When people are faced with increased insecurity and lack sufficient possibilities for adaption, the 
most prominent outcome will be migration. The decision to migrate however, does not mean that 
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people are then sure of finding an environment of more security. On the contrary, often migration 
and conflict are intertwined; especially in areas where the addition of people put strain on already 
scarce resources (Sirkeci, 2009; Homer Dixon, 1992; Gleditsch, 2011). This is visible in many of 
the discussions going on in Europe at the moment, where the refugees e.g. from Syria are 
represented as a threat to national security, ”our places” and resources (Yazgan et al., 2015: 181).  
 
This thesis reflects on concepts of security which might not be equipped to handle processes and 
patterns operating on multiple scales at once. The conceptualization of modern security is to protect 
the nation-state and domestic territory from external threats, as such environmental changes and 
large influx of people without a nation, conflicts with these security concepts (Dalby, 2009; 
Krasner, 2013). However migratory pressure, resulting from and further affecting resource scarcity 
can also lead to increased security especially if the countries prioritize cooperation and joint 
solutions across borders (Sirkeci, 2009). The concepts of human security; changing the referent 
object from the state, to the individual, might be more suitable for understanding these processes 
(Dalby, 2009; Sirkeci, 2009; Crocker, 2013). 
 
The Middle East is currently hosting more than one-third of the world’s refugees (UNHCR, 2015a), 
thus holding the potential for conflict over available resources. Adding to the sensibility of the 
situation is the looming water crisis facing large parts of the region. A newly published report 
ranking the most water stressed regions of the world by 2040, lists 14 Middle Eastern countries at 
high risk. Syria, along with its neighbors Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey are on that list (Maddocks et 
al., 2015). The report argues that population growth, natural or as a result of migration from other 
countries, will increase consumption further straining supply of water (ibid.). 
 
Thus when viewing the Syrian crisis in regards to the studies on environmental changes in the 
region the crisis stands in a different light. Before the 2011 uprising, Syria saw a period of 
consecutive droughts from 2006-2010 which had a devastating impact on Syria’s agricultural 
sector. It resulted in many people inside Syria losing their livelihoods thus many were forced to 
migrate. Some have even argued that the drought was a trigger of the 2011 uprising (de Châtel, 
2014; Gleick, 2014). Thus, the theories on which this thesis relies on suggest that water scarcity 
can, with the right kind of political mismanagement, migration pressure etc., lead to political 
instability (Gleditsch, 2011; Sirkeci, 2009). Then there are multiple layers of the conflict. However 
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the mainstream portrayal focuses primarily on the violence and political unrest, and not the role of 
water scarcity on political stability. 
 
This thesis aims at uncovering the effects of water scarcity in Middle East, on the political stability 
in Syria. While conflict is argued to be a potential outcome, there is also a potential for furthering 
cooperation and understanding across national borders. However the processes the thesis 
investigates, are not solely local in character and neither are the effects of them. The thesis will thus 
investigate the effects of water scarcity on political stability through a multiscale approach, in order 
to understand how local, regional and global patterns and processes intersect, creating a specific 
constellation of security or insecurity. Within the context of this thesis, political stability, first and 
foremost relates to how the effects of water scarcity force or motivate people to migrate. Of equal 
importance is the conflict or cooperation that might arise over access to resources in places of 
origin, transit and destination. 
 
Research Question 
Based on the above, the thesis poses the following research question; 
 
How does the water scarcity in the Middle-East affect political stability on a local, regional and 
global scale? 
 
Analytical Design 
With the research question in mind, the analytical design serves to explain how the thesis will be 
unfolded. The thesis relies on a multiscale approach whilst each sub-research questions revolves 
around a specific scale. The following will thus illustrate how each analysis presents a narrative 
linked to that specific scale of analysis, as well as how these narratives are built using different 
concepts and theories. These concepts will be elaborated on in a later section; as for now it is 
merely about introducing the analyses and how they built upon one another. 
 
The first sub-question involves the local scale, in this case Syria, and is as follows: 
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1. How does water scarcity in the Middle East affect political stability at the local scale? 
The first part of the analysis investigates the processes and patterns related to water scarcity within 
Syria from the start of the century. Syria is placed in a water-scarce region, and in 2006 it entered a 
period of intense drought. The analysis investigates the correlations between water scarcity, rural to 
urban migration and potential conflict or cooperation resulting from these patterns. By doing so, a 
basis for understanding how water scarcity can pose a threat to people's security can be obtained, as 
well as the potentially destabilizing factor water scarcity can have for the nation-state. The concepts 
and theories central to the field of environmental-, human- and national security are applied, to 
understand the processes resulting from water scarcity and their consequences for political stability. 
As these processes are not isolated to the national borders of Syria, the following analysis will 
investigate how water scarcity is affecting and affected by processes and patterns on the regional 
scale; emphasizing on the geopolitical relations between Turkey and Syria. The second sub-
question therefore sounds as follows: 
2. How does water scarcity in the Middle East affect political stability at the regional scale? 
The collaborative water projects and geopolitical relations between Syria and Turkey will be 
investigated, with emphasis on the Greater Anatolia Project headed by Turkey. As in the former 
analysis, it will build on concepts of human-, environmental- and national security to investigate 
how the countries act on water scarcity. In addition, the analysis will show how processes from the 
local scale in Syria, is spilling over into Turkey in the form of mass-migration and some violent 
incidents. It will be investigated, how the Turkish government is responding to these spillovers and 
whether it has put strain on their geopolitical relations in respect to water. The events unfolding on 
the regional scale however cannot be isolated to this scale either. The final chapter will thus 
investigate how these dynamics from the local and regional scale is affecting and affected by 
processes at the global scale. Therefore we pose the following and final question: 
3. How does water scarcity in the Middle East affect political stability at the global scale? 
This final part of the thesis will discuss the potential consequences of water scarcity in the Middle 
East, on a global scale. The chapter thus serves as both an analysis of water scarcity’s effect on 
political stability on the global scale but also a more general discussion of how all the scales 
intersect, to create specific processes. The chapter will discuss the global processes that impact on 
the events highlighted in the former two analyses, as well as show how they have relevance 
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elsewhere in the region. Furthermore it outlines how spillovers from the local and regional scale 
impact on the global scale, with special focus on migration patterns and potential conflict or 
cooperation in its wake. The analysis therefore incorporates literature revolving around the 
relationships between Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, who have experienced severe domestic tensions 
over the large influx of Syrian refugees. This has in turn affected their already scarce supply of 
water. It will be considered how a large number of refugees from the Middle East, have started to 
migrate into Europe and discussed whether or not the international community equipped to respond 
in a way that enhance rather than compromise people’s security. 
 
Delimitation of Research Area 
The following section will explain the limitations of the thesis’ scope, and the considerations taken 
in relation to the time-spatial boundaries of the analyses.   
The thesis focuses on water scarcity in the Middle East, which is a common description for the 
transcontinental region situated between Africa, West-Asia and Europe. The term has been 
criticized as being implicitly Eurocentric, as it is based on the colonial era perception on “the East” 
being divided into near and far, which in and of itself implies that Europe is the center of the world 
(Hanafi, 1998). Although the term has been in use since at least the early 1800’s, the exact region it 
describes has been in flux, as it is often used as a euphemism for the “Muslim” or “Arab” world. 
Traditionally the Middle-East describes the following countries: Cypress, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, and the Palestinian territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. These too are the countries which this thesis refers to 
when using the term Middle-East, as it is an adequate description of the area. Indeed, Syria is not 
the only water-scarce country in the region, as the entire Middle East is experiencing similar 
climatic conditions and issues with access to water. Incorporating the specific patterns and events 
taking place in all of these countries into the analyses is beyond the thesis’ scope.  However, when 
the thesis refers to the Middle East, this is what is meant. The thesis is built as a multiscale case 
study, investigating the local, regional, and global scale. As established, the local scale refers to 
Syria. The region refers to the Middle East; however the analysis will have its offset in the Turkish-
Syrian relations, but draws in other countries in the region when needed. The global scale refers to 
the world, however the third analysis allows the thesis to reflect on some of the other countries in 
the region as well, as and offset for discussion of global processes. 
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The mainstream portrayals of, the civil war in Syria is often discussed as the result of governmental 
failures and political tensions. The issues of water scarcity that has rendered many Syrians insecure 
years before the impact of the civil war is rarely brought to attention. By uncovering layers of the 
civil unrest, it becomes apparent that the issue of water scarcity cannot be ignored.  The thesis’ 
main interest lies in the water crisis at the start of the century, leading up to present time, hence a 
considerable amount of data relates specifically to the timeframe of 2000-2015. That is not to say 
that the issue of water in Syria before that applied timeframe was not severe. Nor is it irrelevant to 
the thesis, as it provides the backbone of the contemporary water affairs seen in Syria today, as well 
as supplementing understanding of the historical tensions and management of water scarcity in the 
region between countries. Drought likewise has always been a factor in the Syrian climate; however 
the increased periods of drought at the start of the century have proven to put Syria in worsening 
conditions.  
 
As such the time-spatial context chosen in the project only reflects itself, rather that the represent 
the wholeness of water scarcity in Syria, or indeed in the Middle East. Tensions due to water related 
issues too are not a new addition to the Syrian-Middle East context. Likewise, the ongoing violent 
conflict in Syria has had an additional impact on the water crisis, which is another variable to the 
total subject of water scarcity. These factors serve as a peripheral issue to the overall aim of the 
thesis.  
 
 
Philosophy of Social Science and Positioning of the Thesis 
The field of philosophy of social science can in a sense be understood as the act of ‘reflexivity’ i.e. 
reflecting over the process of studying social reality. It thus examines how social science can be 
conducted or understood, and the role of the researcher (Delanty et al., 2003: 3). Within critical 
scientific philosophy, some branches predominantly focus on how knowledge obtained from 
scientific activity can and should produce change in current understandings of social reality. In this 
view social reality is collectively constructed and maintained and is therefore malleable. In order to 
understand the ontological world as it is, the researcher needs to uncover the epistemological layers 
of a specific phenomenon (Buch-Hansen et al. 2012: 281ff). 
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The theories and concepts employed in the thesis are largely concerned with challenging the 
normative understandings prescribed to security concepts and causes of conflict in the face of the 
increased understanding of the impacts of environmental changes. Some critical environmental 
theorists go further and argue for the total uprooting of contemporary understandings of the 
environment, especially in the context of humanity’s conduct and impact on it. However this thesis 
focuses more on the nature of uncovering layers of normative understandings of security concepts, 
as put forth by the theoretical background in the Conceptual Framework. Out of all the scholars 
cited in the analyses Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ibrahim Sirkeci are the most prominent. Both have 
taken on a critical approach to security: the environment and migration. As the majority of our 
analysis is built on the work of these two, our thesis has something of a bias towards critical theory. 
A fair deal of this thesis is critical of conventions and established narratives in international politics. 
A central part of critical scientific philosophy is acknowledging one's own bias and positioning as a 
researcher. The authors of this thesis are all students at Northern European universities, with a 
background in international politics, geography and economics which has no doubt affected the 
analyses to a certain extent. A Eurocentric understanding of geography is apparent from the use of 
e.g. the term the Middle East, as previously established. The authors possess no personal sense of 
what water scarcity bears, and the relationship between subject and the researchers are only 
established through the thesis; in other words the researchers are outsiders to their field of study. 
This position is by no means a disadvantage, but is nevertheless important to keep in mind.  
 
When conducting research within the field of critical scientific philosophy, knowledge can produce 
change. By deconstructing the mainstream understandings and uncovering layers of a phenomenon, 
new knowledge and hence measures to understand and respond to the subject investigated emerges. 
The aim of the thesis is thus not to produce concrete suggestions for dealing with water scarcity, but 
understanding the patterns and processes which it produces and is produced by (Buch-Hansen, 
2012: 291ff) 
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Conceptual Framework 
The following chapter outlines the main concepts and theoretical approaches used in the thesis. It 
starts out by describing the concepts of scales. Secondly, it investigates traditional security concepts 
and how they persist today. Thirdly is an outline of Human Security and Environmental Security, 
and afterwards it discusses the tensions between these and the traditional security concepts. It then 
goes on to discuss how the different concepts of human and environmental security complement 
each other in relation to the thesis’ objective.  A sum up of how scales are incorporated in and 
across the different concepts of security then follows. Lastly, in order to encompass further 
understanding of issues dealt with throughout the thesis, the more technical concepts of drought and 
water scarcity will be provided 
Scales 
The term ‘Scale’ has been subject of much theorizing and multiple definitions. The definition used 
in this thesis is one of operational or methodological character, meaning the scale and resolution of 
data collection, stretches over the continuum from the micro scale, e.g. the body, to the macro scale, 
the globe. Scale is usually understood in two ways; either as a real material thing resulting from 
specific political, economic and social processes and struggles, or as a way of framing and 
understanding the world (Herod, 2009: 217). In this thesis, scales are both real material things to the 
people living and acting within them, and a way for them to understand these actions and how they 
connect to places. Furthermore, scales works as a frame for the analyses in this thesis (cf. Analytical 
Design). Thus they are not to be understood as fixed platforms for social activity and processes that 
connect up or down to other hierarchical levels. Instead there is a socio-spatial dialectic: social 
processes and space, hence scales, mutually intersect, constitute, and rebound upon one another in 
an inseparable chain of determinations (Gregory, 2009: 665). Furthermore, scales should not merely 
be understood in regards to a continuum where each space and place fits neatly within one category. 
For geographers, thinking about scales also involves how they link to each other, how the global is 
visible in the local and vice versa. The local can thus be understood as where the global processes 
touch down on Earth’s surface, and likewise, if you scratch anything global you will find locality. 
All places are then hybrid of different scales (Herod, 2009: 230). The thesis therefore relies on a 
multiscale approach, in order to investigate how water scarcity in Syria is influenced by and 
influencing processes and patterns from other scales. Furthermore, the aim of the thesis is to 
examine how water scarcity might impact political stability and people’s sense of security. As such, 
the following section will outline the traditional conceptualization of security.  
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Traditional Security 
Security Studies advanced as an academic field in the context of the Cold War, but it relies on 
concepts and practices dating back to the 17th century. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648, a series of 
peace treaties ending the Thirty Years’ War in Europe, laid the foundation of modern nation-states. 
This model has gradually become an international norm with the European influence spreading 
across the globe. The state-system is thus not a natural one, but a social organization (Jackson et al., 
2013: 10f, 17). Nevertheless, seemingly all men, women and children across the world are 
connected to a state: a bordered territory, with a permanent population under the jurisdiction of a 
supreme government, in other words, a sovereign state (ibid: 4).  
 
In particular, the concept of Westphalian sovereignty means that each state has the right to 
determine its own domestic authority structures, thus that other states should refrain from 
intervening in the internal affairs of that state, which is considered an international norm (Krasner, 
2013: 655). Furthermore, the balance of power between sovereign states was intended to prevent 
any one state from achieving hegemony, which would in effect re-establish the empire system that 
the Westphalian Peace had brought to an end. The global balance of power was thus one of 
multipolarity, with multiple great powers, but throughout the 18th, 19th and 20th century there were 
several major attempts from these powers to impose their political hegemony (Jackson et al., 2013: 
17). It is important to note that striving for and achieving hegemony is not solely considered a threat 
to the nation-state system. Having a regional hegemon may in fact serve as order establishing, and 
ensure peace and cooperation. However, it depends on the strategies and underlying reasoning on 
behalf of the hegemon.  
 
The most common type of warfare at the time was interstate, between two - or more - sovereign 
states, and as a result, security has traditionally been concerned with protection of domestic spaces 
from external threats (Dalby, 2009: 2). It relies on the notion that security is a zero-sum game, in 
which a gain for one state means a loss for another (Gleditsch, 2013: 177). The First and Second 
World War were large scale examples of sovereign states engaging in warfare over territorial 
jurisdiction, and by the end had completely changed the global security environment. The global 
balance of power changed to one of bipolarity, with the US and Soviet Union as the superpowers of 
the world (Jackson et al., 2013: 17).  
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Increased globalization and advancements in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
resulted in the world growing more interconnected and interdependent. Furthermore, the world saw 
a proliferation of new, barely viable states, breaking free from colonial rule.  Consequently security 
concerns no longer solely revolved around the protection of domestic spaces, but increasingly 
around securing regional and global stability. Potential spillover from national and regional 
conflicts was seen as a threat that could upset the stability of the entire global state-system 
(Freedman, 2013: 246f). Even with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the shift to global 
unipolarity, these security concerns continue to persist. Now, most conflicts are seen to lie within 
the inner weakness of new states and their incapability to control their frontiers, rather than the 
great power struggles. Threats to domestic spaces can then be inter- and intrastate, regional or 
global in character (Ibid.: 247). Security then involves broader concerns with security, health, 
political violence, livelihoods and infrastructure (Dalby, 2009: 7). In an attempt to adapt to the 
changing security environment, the international community has reformulated the concepts of 
sovereignty. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) defends the principle of humanitarian intervention 
of one state in another, if that government abuses, or fails to protect, its own citizens (Krasner, 
2013: 659). It then breaks with the idea of absolute Westphalian sovereignty, making it a privilege 
rather than a right (Crocker et al., 2013: 12). In practice, the R2P is not sufficiently implemented in 
current security practices of states, which will still only intervene in a conflict if it poses a threat to 
national security or a possible gain for the state (Marten, 2013: 627). Thus political order and state 
sovereignty remain essential in the conceptualization of security even when transnational threats 
appears to pose a greater danger to people today. 
 
Human Security 
A new security concept has emerged in this context and is challenging the traditional focus on the 
security of the state: Human Security, examines ways to secure the overall well-being of individuals 
and sub-state groups and corresponds with wider notions of universal human rights (Crocker, 2013: 
355). Building on the concept of Human Security, The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) argued that the concept of security has been interpreted too narrowly, and that a move 
away from preoccupations with territorial security is needed. The UNDP identifies four essential 
characteristics of human security: it is a universal concern, the components of security are 
interdependent, it is easier to ensure human security through early prevention and it involves a shift 
of the referent object from states to people. Furthermore, it finds that threats to Human Security 
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often is caused by the many rather than the few, e.g. excessive international migration and 
environmental degradation (Dalby, 2009: 42). 
 
According to Sirkeci, threats to human security appear in many forms and may create an 
environment of human insecurity. Human insecurity is always linked to conflict of some sort, which 
results in people perceiving their places of habitat as insecure. The notions of human insecurity are 
thus subjective and relative. Perceived human insecurity can be triggered by political conflicts, but 
also by lack of economic opportunities, poor governance, mismanagement of resources, threats 
from slow- or rapid-onset environmental disasters and any other threat to people's general welfare. 
In relation to the thesis’ research question, water - or the lack of such - constitutes a significant 
push-factor towards an environment of human insecurity. WaterAid, an international organization 
working to improve access to safe water, sanitation and hygiene, defines water security as:  
“Reliable access to water of sufficient quantity and quality for basic human needs, small-scale 
livelihoods and local ecosystems, coupled with a well-managed risk of water related diseases” 
(WaterAid, 2012: 5).  
As such a slow-onset environmental disaster, like water scarcity, constitutes a source of conflict and 
insecurity (Sirkeci, 2009: 10). This is summed up in the term environmental insecurity, stating that 
the (in)security of the environment affects the (in)security of human beings. In order words, 
environmental degradation that threatens human welfare and practices is a security threat. Climate 
change and its effects on the environment of security can then be seen as a significant threat to 
human life. This is indeed a subject that inspires much dispute in mainstream domains and political 
circles, as climate change is partially a natural process and external to human influence. However, a 
term that has been primarily brought up in academic and international organizations is 
acknowledging that climate change can contribute to migration and displacement; 'climate refugee'. 
It further enhances the complicated discourses of human security, as it places the focus on the 
global impact of climate change, and  opens up for the possibility of a common issue, or indeed, 
responsibility. Environmental security is thus a part of the human security, which presents a more 
useful frame of understanding of how the environment and security are interlinked, as the threats 
and impact posed by the environment does not neatly fit within the boxes of the nation-state. Before 
going into more detail with this, the following section will outline the main theoretical 
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developments within the field of environmental security, as it is a central part of the field of human 
security. 
  
Environmental Security 
In the beginning of 1990s the environmental facets in conflicts increasingly became subject to 
research. Within this field of research various components have been highlighted, such as; the 
causality between environmental stress and violent conflict; the resources fought over in the 
conflicts; the types of conflicts that are prone to manifest; and how they may unfold. One research 
into resource scarcity and violent conflict, conducted by the Toronto Group, found that 
environmentally induced resource scarcity plays a role in violent conflicts in many developing 
countries. This is however an additional one, which in combination with political, economic and 
social factors can lead to potential violent conflict. Another study by the Zurich Group found that 
environmental changes can increase existing socio-economic conflict, potentially to the point of 
violence (WBGU, 2008 : 27). 
The research in the field of Environmental Security thus highlights the importance of determining 
links of causality. The general consensus within the field is that violent conflict is not a direct 
consequence of climate change or specific environmental changes, but only in some cases a 
contributing factor. Gleditsch, a central scholar in the field of environmental security, likewise 
sustains this in this framework, as shown below: 
 
Figure 1: Possible pathways from climate change to conflict: 
 
(Gleditsch, 2011: 5) 
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He argues that changes in the environment, e.g. water scarcity, can lead to loss of livelihood, 
economic decline, and increased insecurity either directly or through forced migration. Migration is 
thus viewed as the most prominent outcome, an argument also made by Thomas Homer-Dixon. 
Hence, when a large number of people migrate, the resources available in the area or country the 
migrants move to become additionally stressed (Homer-Dixon, 1992: 5), Food insecurity, and in 
general any disturbance to the stability of food resources or supply can be understood as a risk that 
the population must be secured from (Barnett, 2001: 24). Loss of resources due to degradation or 
changes of the environment, then, are not only a threat for the population but also for the state, 
which has the responsibility to protect its citizens. Gleditsch then argues that, if there at the same 
time is poor governance, social inequalities and local grievances, these factors in turn may promote: 
political and economic instability, social fragmentation, additional migration, and inappropriate 
responses from governments. As a result tensions may rise and create an environment of 
opportunity for opposition, potentially escalating into violent conflicts that are detrimental to the 
state (Gleditsch, 2011: 5). Hence, there are many different factors constituting the root causes of a 
conflict, and  different types and levels of conflict. In relation to water scarcity, conflict may arise 
over the policies of distribution of available resources. The conflicts most likely to spawn due to 
environmental scarcity are firstly clashes of ethnic groups due to population migration, “group-
identity conflict”. The second type of conflict might arise is the “relative-deprivation conflict”, 
resulting from failure of the state to minimize civil disorder as a reaction against the impact of the 
changes on their economic productiveness and livelihoods (Homer-Dixon, 1992: 5; Libiszewski, 
1992: 12).  
 
Findings within the field of environmental security are highly contextual. Hence,  it is important to 
be aware of uniqueness and contextuality of each case, as well as the applied methods and criteria. 
Additionally, the individual countries' notion of  the environment and thus the perceived impact of 
environmental changes constitute a central factor in framing environmental changes as a threat. The 
approaches towards dealing with environmental issues are largely performed through political 
institutions and measures, wherein the dominant political ideology guides the approach. Political 
ideology then influences whether environmental changes are perceived as a security threat, and if 
so, to what extent. Therefore, it is important to take note of the underlying assumptions informing 
policies and measures taken on by the main governing institutions, which will be a subject of the 
first analysis of this thesis. A central factor in environmental security is then, that the problems 
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posed by environmental changes cannot be isolated from broader social contexts (Barnett, 2001: 12 
& 17). This is similar to research of Stephan Libiszewski which proposes that; conflicts or 
challenges that are perceived to have been caused by climate or environmental changes are 
essentially social in nature (Libiszewski, 1992).  
 
 
Paradigms colliding 
In the face of the security threat posed by environmental changes, the relevance of traditional 
security concepts is more complex to grasp. As outlined earlier, traditional security has been about 
protection from external threats, or internal subversion of political order, not something that is self-
imposed (Dalby, 2009: 2). The question then becomes, whether traditional security measures can be 
used to deal with threats from the environment. According to Simon Dalby, the underlying political 
assumptions of autonomy, at the scale of either the individual or the state,   in mainstream security 
are no longer tenable. As the geography of environmental changes and globalization crosses 
national borders, the focus on national security is not helpful to understand these social and political 
relationships (Dalby, 2009: 160ff). Yet the assumptions informing discussions of what should be 
done in the face of climate change frequently focus on the need to change government policies and 
rules, or to enforce management standards within territorial jurisdictions. The debates are often 
technical in character and result in administrative and often quantifiable procedures. Security 
concerns remain conceptualized around the nation-state; borders are patrolled, migrants 
documented, and hostile forces repelled by numerous technical practices. Dalby thus argues, that we 
may have to abandon security; insofar it is about making things “stay the same” as it is, in fact, part 
of the problem (Dalby, 2009: 4). In line with this, others even concluded that prioritizing security 
was nearly the worst possible step forward (ibid: 4). Instead, they are inclined towards prioritizing 
human security, by focusing on patterns and processes; affecting the environment of human security 
taking place across national borders and at various scales. 
 
An Environment of Human Security 
As outlined earlier, the scholars in the field of environmental security sees migration as the most 
prominent outcome of changes in the environment. Sirkeci likewise argues, that an environment of 
(perceived) human insecurity, leaves people with two options; stay and adapt or leave. If they see 
sufficient push-factors, they will be more inclined towards the latter (Sirkeci, 2009). Thus so-called 
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disruptive migration events can be stimulated by war, civil conflict, economic collapse, natural 
disasters, famines and the like (Dalby, 2009: 145).  
There are hundreds of studies qualitatively showing that there are multiple motivations for 
migration (Yazgan et al., 2015: 182). The Nansen Initiative uses three categories of displacement, 
which can be understood as a continuum, from forced displacement, voluntary migration and 
(forced or voluntary) planned relocation. Displacement refers to situations where people are forced 
or obliged to leave their homes, often due to natural hazards and/or violent conflict. The planned 
relocation of people within a country is a measure to move people from areas where they would 
face a high risk of exposure to a serious natural hazard (Kaelin, 2015: 2). Displacement tends to 
emphasize push factors to leave and migration emphasizes pull factors at the intended destination 
(IDMC, 2015: 65). However, each will be a mixture of both. The difference between voluntary and 
forced migration is particularly difficult to distinguish during slowly evolving disasters, such as the 
drought in Syria. During rapidly developing hazards, people are often forced to flee their homes 
with little notice in response to the immediate threat. Gradual and long-lasting hazards such as 
drought however tend to act as indirect stressors on living conditions, melting into a mix of other 
socio-economic, political and cultural drivers increasing exposure and vulnerability. Slow-onset 
changes in the environment thus allow people more time to consider and take steps to avoid, 
mitigate and adapt to impacts on their homes and livelihoods. People may even choose to migrate 
before the situation turns into an acute crisis, blurring the distinction between forced displacement 
and voluntary migration (IDMC, 2015: 14).  
The difference between a refugee and an economic migrant is thus constructed. Sirkeci argues that 
all human mobility is caused by some kind of a conflict. In fact, most economic migrants have some 
story of difficulty pushing them to other areas (Sirkeci, 2009: 7). In addition, all refugees have an 
obvious economic cause along with the immediate threat they are escaping from (Yazgan et al., 
2015: 182). Furthermore, the survival options for the poorest and most vulnerable may be severely 
circumscribed in the face of environmental changes. Therefore it could be argued that their decision 
to leave always constitutes a form of insecurity regardless of the hazards that contributed to it 
(IDMC, 2015: 14). Sirkeci hence argues that the main motive in international migration is seeking 
(human) security; or avoiding (perceived) human insecurity. Thereby he overrides the existing 
typologies e.g. refugee, asylum-seeker, irregular migrations etc., as these categories are more often 
reflections of legislation rather than actual patterns and behaviors of migration (Sirkeci, 2009: 7). 
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The security of migrants and non-migrants thus often differs from the security of states at origin, in 
transit or in destination (Sirkeci, 2009: 5). Human security is not isolated to national borders, but is 
very much about dealing with people on the move (Dalby, 2009: 143). These people will be seen 
either as victims in need of assistance or as illegal immigrants, who can be portrayed as a security 
threat to the nation-state. This depends on  whether they will be labeled as “others”, not belonging 
to “our places”, which is an example of a group-identity conflict. The nation-state might be an 
imagined community as the members of the nation will never know their fellow-members but it 
does not make them false or weak (Katz, 2009: 237f). On the contrary, nation-states constitute the 
main societal borders of the modern world, they have a strong influence on its populations’ creation 
of identity and sense of belonging. Thus, insofar as xenophobic nationalism is seen as the 
appropriate response,  displaced people will experience increased insecurity (Dalby, 2009: 145).  
Dalby likewise points to larger consequences when he argues that criminalizing “illegal 
immigrants” and acting based on nationalist concerns, can cause both a humanitarian disaster and 
international tension (ibid.). Sirkeci presents a similar argument by stating that the environment of 
human security or insecurity is connected to a continuum of conflict. Conflict in this sense, covers 
all relations that involve incompatible differences in objectives. The continuum of conflict thus 
moves from cooperation, where differences are cleared to violent conflicts where consensus is 
either not possible or not preferred, thereby affecting the environment of human security (Sirkeci, 
2009: 8). 
Figure 2: Environment of Human Insecurity and Conflict 
 
(Sirkeci, 2009: 8). 
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In this conflict-driven migration model Sirkeci highlights an important feature of the relative 
environment of security, corresponding somewhat with Gleditsch’s figure over possible pathways 
from climate change to conflict. Namely in the face of changes in the environment of security, the 
involved actors have the possibility to either seek towards more cooperation, or more conflict. Poor 
governance or inappropriate responses from either officials or the general population, would be 
considered a move towards violence and conflict, thereby creating an environment of human 
insecurity and a possible motivation for opposition. 
 
Security and Scales 
As highlighted in the first section in this Conceptual Framework, processes and patterns occur on 
and intersect with multiple scales. Sirkeci likewise argues, that conflict appears across various 
places and scales, and might spillover from one scale to another. Security and scales are then 
interlinked, and each concept of security presented in this chapter operates on specific scales. The 
mainstream conceptualization of security is highly focused on the nation-state, while human 
security changes the referent object to the individual. Furthermore, both concepts of security link to 
different scales. National security has elements of the local scale, as protection of the national 
population is its main task and on the global scale, as the nation-states function in an international 
state-system. Likewise, Human security emphasizes the protection of individuals across national 
borders and highlights global processes and patterns as potential risks to people’s security. 
The definition of scale used in this thesis has various analytical complexities. The first includes the 
claims that social patterns and processes can be sorted according to their scale of operation. As a 
result, an appropriate match between research questions and the scale of analysis is important when 
developing a research design. The second is that some processes may operate at multiple scales at 
once. Thus attention should be paid to their operational distinctiveness at particular scales and to the 
mechanisms that define their modifications from one scale to the next. Herein lies a key 
argumentation for this thesis’ use of a multiscale approach; as the social patterns on e.g. the local 
scale, influence the patterns and processes on the national, regional and even global scale in an 
interconnected and interdependent world. Finally, in line with the above, scaled process can 
intersect with other processes operating at any other scale, often in complex ways that attenuate, 
amplify or destabilize their operation. In sum, social patterns and processes intersect with and 
spillover from one scale to another. For example, environmental changes in one region might force 
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people to move to other places, thus presenting problems for other regions. Causal complications of 
this kind, wherein processes are conceived using their own terms but also in terms of their scales of 
operation, are examples of the more powerful arguments for the necessity of incorporating space 
into social science (Gregory, 2009: 664f). 
 
Concepts of Drought and Water Scarcity 
The following section present the indicators and concepts used in the thesis to determine the kind 
and severity of drought and water scarcity. In order to ensure a better understanding of all the 
concepts used in the thesis, it has been placed in its own section. However, it relates to the concepts 
presented above as drought and water scarcity are examples of processes and patterns which can 
potentially render a large number of people insecure. Thus drought and water scarcity can create an 
environment of human insecurity and be a factor in a possible pathway to conflict (Sirkeci, 2009, 
Gleditsch, 2011). Drought is a temporary event in which a deviation from normal water availability 
occurs, mostly manifested by a reduction of average precipitation. Drought is relative to its 
environment's normal conditions therefore, what might be above average precipitation in one region 
may in fact be below average in another in which a 'global' definition of drought is unwarranted 
(Sivakumar, 2005:3). Furthermore, it is also difficult to assess when a period of drought starts and 
ends as drought may last one season or more, due to other climatic factors such as temperature, 
wind etc. which can affect and prolong them.  
 
There are three general types of drought; meteorological, agricultural, and hydrological drought. 
Meteorological drought is below average deviation of precipitation relative to normal conditions, as 
previously presented, and is generally the first manifestation of drought. Agricultural drought refers 
to the negative impact on crop production due to insufficient moisture which can be caused by 
meteorological drought, but also due to human management of the soil conditions or applied 
agricultural techniques. Hydrological drought refers to groundwater levels and surface water flow 
that falls below the statistical average in water reserves such as aquifers, and too can occur due the 
deviation of precipitation, as well as human misusage (Sivakumar, 2005; ibid; Anisfeld, 2010: 89). 
Shimon Anisfeld also includes a fourth type; socioeconomic drought, which is the social and 
economic results of the former three types combined. The results often manifest in crop failure 
leading to economic devastation and starvation (Anisfeld, 2010: 90). Drought therefore is a natural 
phenomenon, yet also a phenomenon brought forth by human conduct involving soil and water. 
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There are several indexes for establishing drought, however the aim of this project is not to 
determine nor examine drought itself in Syria, but rather discuss the occurrence of drought, how it 
interlinks with water scarcity, and its implications in contemporary Syrian affairs. Additionally 
studies already conducted on drought in Syria are in-depth and numerous, of which this thesis will 
rely on instead. 
 
Similar to the methodology of drought there are several tools and models to determine water 
scarcity, each with their own definitions, advantages and limitations. According to Anisfeld, one of 
the most widely used methods of defining water scarcity is the Falkenmark "water crowding 
indicator". The Falkenmark indicators’ primary definition is based upon the number of people 
sharing a unit of water, in other words water availability per capita. As the indicator increases, an 
increase in societal water stresses will follow (Anisfeld, 2010: 77f). To explain and discuss water 
scarcity in Syria regionally the thesis will rely on the denominators that are common to the majority 
of methods of determining scarcity of water. This being; the amount of people and their need for 
water in a given country, the environment's own need for water and the availability of water to 
sustain both needs (renewability and sustainability). Another factor to include is the nature of the 
water scarcity at hand; whether water is a supply (physically available) problem or a demand 
(management) problem (Rijsberman, 2005 : 6f). The definition of water scarcity is dependent of the 
authors' chosen method and thus, water scarcity can be measured a multitude of ways. The studies 
used in this thesis examine water scarcity through the Falkenmark indicator and thus, measures 
water scarcity in Syria per capita. 
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Methodology 
The following chapter outlines the methods used in the thesis to answer the research question. The 
thesis is structured as a case study of water scarcity in Syria, and how it affects and is affected by 
processes at the regional and global scale. The chapter will establish why the case study is the most 
suitable approach for this thesis and describes how the case study is built, using theory and data.  
 
Case Study 
This thesis investigates water scarcity in Syria through a multi-scale approach. It then involves both 
water scarcity’s effect on political stability within Syria and its’ effects on the political relationships 
between Syria and its’ surroundings.  
Robert Yin (2009) has argued that using a case study is an advantage when “how” or “why” 
questions are being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little 
or no control (Yin, 2009: 13). Hence, the thesis’ research question corresponds with the three 
characteristics set forward by Yin. It is a “how” question, surrounding contemporary events of 
which the authors, pose no control over. Based on these observations, the case study research is the 
most suitable method to answer our research question. 
 
While there is no single way to define what a case study research is, it can generally be 
characterized as a; "(..) research approach in which one or a few instances of phenomenon are 
studied in depth" (Blatter, 2008: 68). Despite the proliferation of case studies in social sciences, the 
case study method has been contested, often in favor for more quantitative methods (Blatter, 2008: 
ibid; Flyvbjerg, 2011: 302 ). Bent Flyvbjerg explores and challenges the negative arguments against 
the use of case study method in the academic community. The general critiques mainly revolve 
around the notions that specific case studies are not suitable for summarizing, generalization or 
theorizing, due to their origination and thus dependence on specific contexts.  
 
In relation to theorization, social science differs from natural science in its rejection of a universal 
truth, therefore the context-dependent knowledge drawn from a case study is more useful to extract 
than attempts at constructing a predictive theories (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 304). This is strength of the 
case study method; the intense or in-depth study of a unit of analysis allows for the production of "a 
detailed historical account" (Blatter, 2008: ibid). In this thesis, the production of historical and 
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context-dependent knowledge is vital to establish in order to understand the events and patterns in 
Syria and what possibly caused them to be. 
 
The second common critique is that generalization cannot be drawn from a single case, as case 
studies are limited to their contextual basis and due to this cannot serve scientific progress. 
However Flyvbjerg argues that not only is it possible to generalize from a single case; the 
supplement of the case into another work, or its study through another method, also establishes new 
information, which can bring forth scientific development (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 305). The same can be 
argued for the multiscale approach taken on in this thesis. By looking at processes and patterns on 
different scales, and how they intersect in specific context, a more comprehensive understanding of 
the case is gained (Gregory, 2009: 664f). 
 
The difficulty of summarization of case studies is not due to the method itself, but the nature of the 
social reality that case studies are dependent on. In response to summarization, Flyvbjerg agrees 
that “often it is not desirable to summarize and generalize case studies”, proposing that case 
studies act better as narratives (Flyvbjerg, 2011: 313). Indeed, the Syria presented in this thesis 
cannot be utilized as a generalization for the Middle East, or a generalization of Syria itself, and 
hence it is not an aim of the thesis to establish this. Additionally, as the affairs studied in the thesis 
are constantly developing it is also difficult to ‘summarize’; however, the thesis’ results can be 
gathered into a broader Syrian-contextual frameworks, and thus serve as a narrative that is specific 
to a certain point in time. The conclusions that can be draw from this thesis can be argued to only 
exist directly in the context of the thesis’ case study and subjects, but can be useful in studies 
wherein similar conditions or contexts apply. The case study approach, then, is not only a suitable 
tool to gather extensive knowledge on a subject; it can serve as a ‘brick’ in wall that can be built 
upon further. The case study method is then helpful in uncovering underlying layers of a given 
phenomenon or process, which is a key part of critical scientific philosophy. 
In conclusion, conducting a case study on Syria through a multiscale approach, allows the thesis to 
collect relevant knowledge on water scarcity, how water scarcity has occurred, its implications 
locally, regionally and globally, and how it may factor into political stability across scales. Links 
between water scarcity and political stability can thus be examined according to their scale of 
operation and it can be determined how they are linked; as they cannot be completely isolated from 
each other. 
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Building the Case Study 
In the following section it will be explained how the case study and the narratives each analysis will 
tell, has been built around both data and theory. As the case study is utilized through a multiscale 
approach, each analysis will investigate a specific narrative on a specific scale, in regards to the 
overall research question and case (cf. Analytical Design). 
 
In order to write the narratives for each scale, or analytical chapter, an extensive literature review 
has been conducted. Inspired by discourses and theories suggesting that climate change is causing 
conflict and forcing people on the move, the initial thesis sought to uncover what lies beyond the 
mainstream discourses of conflict and migration. The current Syrian migrant crisis at the center of 
attention in European foreign policies is mainly explained as a result of civil war. However, by 
seeking out literature in order to gain knowledge of both the issues of climate change, migration and 
conflict, certain patterns emerged which has molded the thesis’ final research area and case study. 
From there, a comprehensive Conceptual Framework was structured around the main concepts, 
theories and discussion relevant for the field of research, which have been the frame for further data 
collection and structuring of the thesis. The next sections will first go into detail with the conceptual 
framework, and then how it has guided data collection and the analyses. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
The thesis builds on a conceptual framework that is based on an extensive literature review over the 
theories and concept relevant for the field of study. It draws on concepts from Geography and the 
field of International Studies and Security Studies. While the different subjects have various 
focuses, there are many similarities and overlaps between their fields of study. As such, combining 
the concepts has been straightforward, and the concepts used from Geography have mainly served 
to spatialize the security concepts used.  
Broadly defined, the conceptual framework is divided into three main themes: 
1. Presentation of the concept of Scales 
2. Presentation of relevant Security Concepts 
3. A discussion of how Security and Scale are interlinked. 
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However, the second theme is further divided into three sub-themes, as the thesis relies on various 
security concepts, such as National Security, Human Security and Environmental Security. Among 
the main contributors are Sirkeci in regards to an environmental and human security, Gleditsch and 
his framework over possible pathways from climate change to conflict, as well as multiple scholars 
conceptualizing the concept of National Security. Furthermore, the Conceptual Framework 
discusses how the concepts either intersect or contest one another. For example, National Security 
and Human/Environmental Security have different referent objects and emphasize different scales 
of operation. It thus culminates in a presentation of how our main theoretical contributions fit 
together, and can be applied in the analyses. Political and environmental geography merge through 
the thesis’ security framework. The approach of multiple scales further enhances this constellation 
and allows the research questions to be examined and answered in a manner that relates to both the 
thesis’ research area, methods, and geographical studies.  
After the above concepts of scales and security has been presented and discussed, a brief section 
will present some indicators used to determine the severity of drought and water scarcity. As the 
thesis relies on such indicators to understand the drought in Syria, the concepts are important for the 
reader's understanding. However, the density of the information presented means that it was thought 
more suitable to put in a separate section. 
 
Hence, the Conceptual Framework is the basis of our analyses, as it presents all the concepts used 
throughout the thesis. As such, the construction of the Conceptual Framework has as well structured 
our data collection and construction of each narrative presented in the analyses. How and what data 
have been used, will be elaborated on in the following section. 
 
Data Collection 
As the thesis is not conducted in the geographical location of the subject of research, secondary 
literature comprises the only sources of material on which the thesis builds its knowledge and 
subsequently, case study. The thesis and case study thus relies heavily on peer-reviewed articles and 
books, as well as reports from acknowledged international organizations such as the UN. Not only 
does this ensures validity and credibility of the applied information, but also sustains the knowledge 
of which the thesis’ research is based on. While the majority of the data used is peer-reviewed, 
some news articles are incorporated to describe more current developments. However, the 
magazines and bureaus where the articles originated  are all well-known and generally regarded as 
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credible news sources. As such, they contribute with up-to-date knowledge of various developments 
related to the thesis case study. There is of course a potential for adopting bias of some scholars, but 
by not relying on only one source to sustain an argument and by using different sources throughout 
the analyses attempts have been made to ensure validity. Furthermore, we have tried to make it 
explicit when an argument is the product of a specific scholar’s opinion.  
 
Our inability to understand any of the local languages in the investigated region , namely Arabic 
and Turkish, means that we have had to use sources written in English, and as a result much of the 
literature stems from Western countries. However as their research has been reviewed by their 
fellow scholars and is endorsed by acclaimed institutions, it has been deemed valid for use. By 
conducting secondary literature reviews, the following have been established. First, as previously 
mentioned, there is a vast research of Syria arguing for the role of water in the recent conflict, and 
impact on political stability. Second, the causes and the extent of migration patterns within the 
region could be extracted. Third, peer-reviewed articles provide extensive background and indeed 
new knowledge on which the thesis can built upon. The particular focuses on water, migration, and 
political stability thus unfolded through the review of secondary literature. 
 
The data collection has been guided by the concepts and theories in the Conceptual Framework, and 
as such there is the risk that some data can be disregarded as irrelevant. Attempts have been made to 
touch upon the various elements presented to us through the data collection process. However in the 
Conceptual Framework, the data collected and how it is used ,all has to relate to the thesis’ research 
question. Therefore the selection of data , theory, and establishing its relevance is based on the 
objective of the thesis. 
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Water Scarcity and Political Stability at the Local Scale 
This analysis will investigate how water scarcity, and the resulting migration from rural to urban 
areas, affects political stability at the local scale. In this analysis the local scale refers to Syria. The 
analysis sets out with a brief presentation of the impact of the droughts and water scarcity in Syria. 
It then goes on to discuss how the lack of water has resulted in rural to urban migration, while the 
often multiple motivations for migration will also be addressed. The analysis relies on concepts and 
theories presented in the Conceptual Framework, with emphasis on the concepts of human-, 
environmental- and national security, Sirkeci’s continuum of conflict and human security and 
Gleditsch’s framework over possible pathways to conflict. The final part of the analysis, will 
discuss how water scarcity and the resulting migration might have been a contributing factor in the 
2011 uprising. 
 
Figure 3: Political Map of Syria 
 
(United Nations Geospatial Information Section, 2012)  
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The Syrian Climate and Water Sources  
The first part of the analysis relies on the concepts and indicators of drought and water scarcity 
presented in the Conceptual Framework in order to examine its occurrence in Syria. To further 
understand how Syria is affected by drought and water scarcity the geography of Syria, mainly 
focused on its water resources, will be illustrated. 
 
The water resources in Syria consist of rivers, springs, wells and seven water basins. The water 
basins are called; Barada & Awaj, Al-Yarmouk, Orontes, Dajleh & Khabour, Euphrates & Aleppo, 
the Desert, and the Coastal Basins (Mourad et al, 2012: 15; Mourad & Alshehabi, 2015: 2). Of the 
seven basins, only three of them have a positive water balance. This means that total water 
availability exceeds total water usage. The remaining basins are thus subject to insufficient 
management (Barnes, 2013: 512). Each basin provides surface and groundwater resources. The 
surface waters consist of 21 main rivers, wherein 12 are shared with neighboring countries and 
some which are seasonal streams. Furthermore there are 8 main lakes and 150 surface dams in 
Syria.  
 
The groundwater comprises of over 200.000 wells, of which nearly half are illegal, and 140 springs, 
of which a significant proportion are experiencing a deteriorating rate of water availability. More 
than 40 percent of the springs have an average quantity of less than 15 liters per second hence 
decreasing regional water availability (Mourad & Alshehabi, 2015: 2f ). This is problematic for a 
country of Syria’s size as a relatively slow rate of refreshment means that unwise or excessive 
consumption can either lead to drought or even worse scarcity, as it will take even longer for the 
water to start flowing again, if at all. Syria's annual rainfall is less than 250 mm on average (Gleick, 
2014: 332). This is not significantly lower than the average annual rainfall of its immediate 
neighbors, however, that does not say much since Syria is situated in one of the most arid regions of 
the world (Maddock et al., 2015). 
 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) have estimated that total 
renewable water availability, combined surface and groundwater, is around 16.8km³ yr. ‾¹, which 
means Syria only has 16.8 km3 of available and renewable water in a year. This is problematic for a 
country with a population of more than 22 million and a total area of 185,180 km2, as it effectively 
means that the country can house significantly more people than can be sustained. Thus it can be 
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concluded that Syria, under the right circumstances, has always been susceptible to water scarcity 
per capita, even prior to the drought in 2006.  
 
The consecutive periods of drought, starting in 2006 and lasting into 2011 have by many been 
dubbed the worst in centuries (Gleick, 2014: 332). Some scholars suggest that this particular multi-
year drought has its offset in climate change. Rising temperatures, decrease in water levels, coupled 
with population growth is thus argued to be among the significant sources of the drought (Femia et 
al., 2012). The drought had immense impact on the Syrian land mass, water supply and thus 
people's sense of security. In relation to this, it is important to factor in the amount of people in need 
of water resources as water scarcity is as much about how water is managed and divided, and 
amongst how many. 
 
 
Population Growth and External Relations: Impact on Water Resources 
As outlined in the Conceptual Framework, water scarcity is commonly measured in units of per 
capita, in which the subject of population growth becomes relevant to include. The population in 
Syria has increased dramatically over the last decades and further restrained water resources. In 
1950 the Syrian population stood at 3 million and by 2012 the number exceeded 22 million; the 
total renewable water availability per capita has thus decreased from over 5500m³ per person per 
year to under 760m³ by 2012 (Gleick, 2014: 332). A country's water supply can be said to 
experience water scarcity if it falls below 1000m³; absolute scarcity occurs when the water supply 
falls below 500m³ (Rijsberman, 2005: 7). Syria's renewable water supply is balancing between the 
two. Population growth has then substantially added to the predicament of water scarcity.  
 
Another important aspect for understanding Syria’s water scarcity, is to be found in the fact that up 
to 60 percent of Syria’s water resources originates externally (Gleick, 2014, ibid). Syria's water 
supply is impacted by external factors, as it shares the rivers of Tigris, Euphrates, Orontes, and 
Yarmouk/Jordan with its neighbors, which are some of the most important water sources to Syria. 
This particular constellation has often been cause of tension, due to various water projects and 
hydro-dam construction leading to diminishing water supply in Syria (Gleick, 2014: 332; Mourad et 
al., 2012: 16). Syria's neighboring countries are in similar plights as their water supplies too are 
scarce. The subject of regional actors' role in water scarcity in Syria will be further elaborated in the 
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following chapter regarding regional affairs. Nevertheless, it is important to add that external 
factors contribute to the scarce water supply of Syria on the local scale. In the following sections the 
analysis turns to the effects of the water scarcity, first in relation to the arable land, then the 
agricultural sector and finally to the population and their livelihoods. 
 
 
Usage of Water Resources: The Agricultural Sector and Governmental Policies 
The Arab Center for Study of Arid Zones and Dry lands (ACSAD) conducted a ten-year study 
(2000-2010) which identifies that 26.69 percent, of Syria's total land area of 185.180 km², was 
highly vulnerable to drought, whilst 36.96 percent was moderately vulnerable to drought (ACSAD, 
2011: 12ff). In other words, around two-thirds of Syria was moderately to highly vulnerable to 
drought at the first decade of the new century. The majority of the areas experiencing high to 
moderate vulnerability are areas of fundamental importance for crop production (ACSAD, 2011: 
25). In addition, land areas that were arable in 2010 made up 22.34 percent of total available land in 
Syria (ACSAD, 2011: 15), which is a decrease from 25.22 percent arable land in 2001 (Lesch, 
2007: 260). The drought thus eliminated Syria’s self-sufficiency when it comes to food, adding an 
agricultural aspect to the drought (cf. Conceptual Framework). For the first time in two decades, 
Syria became an importer of wheat, of which had previously been a key export commodity 
(Haysom et al., 2011: 11; Barnes, 2013: 515). The agricultural sector was then severely affected by 
the droughts. This is problematic as Syria is economically dependent on its agricultural sector, 
whilst the rural communities are dependent on it for subsistence (Lesch et al., 2007: 275).  
 
To maintain the agricultural sector, water is needed. The contemporary agricultural sector and the 
current irrigation systems are highly undeveloped and unsustainable. The Syrian authorities have a 
claimed goal to develop the sector further in order to enhance national security, through self-
sufficient food security. This means that up to 90 percent of Syria’s water resources are consumed 
by the agriculture sector (Mourad et al., 2012: 16; Mourad & Alshehabi, 2015: 1; Barnes, 2013: 
512). The remaining 10 percent is split so that; 8 percent goes to domestic uses, and 2 percent goes 
to industry (Barnes, 2013: 514). The fact that the majority of the available water is used in the 
agricultural sector is largely a result of government policies. As mentioned above, the onset of the 
2006-2011 droughts required Syria to import a majority of its wheat due to crop failures and limited 
water, yet the drought is only one contributor to this predicament. Government policies regarding 
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the utilization and management of water are subsequently linked to agriculture and thus food 
insecurity. The Syrian government has provided large subsidies for some of the most fertile areas 
for the production of water-intensive crops, such as wheat and cotton. Subsidizing at the hands of 
politicians and entrepreneurs, leaves out small scale farmers and further complicates the matter of 
supply versus demand (Gleick, 2014: 334; Haysom et al., 2011: 3). These state policies therefore 
pose significant challenges to the farmers and their families livelihoods. They have thus resorted to 
different adaptation strategies, which is examined in the following section. 
 
 
Adapting to Water Scarcity 
In order to irrigate their crops farmers have turned to the groundwater resources by using wells that 
tap into aquifers, which have increased subsequently from 135.000 in 1999 to more than 213.000 in 
2007. This practice is unwarranted, as for one, in some parts of the country the groundwater levels 
have dropped, thus increasing hydrological drought (cf. Conceptual Framework). Secondly, there is 
no official management of the practice as such the water quality in the aquifers after use is unknown 
at best (Femia et al., 2012). Currently half of all irrigation is achieved by pumping groundwater. 
Furthermore, less than one fifth of irrigation is achieved through modern practices and techniques. 
Overpumping of the groundwater is not only environmentally degrading, but also economically 
unwise as the action is costly in production (Gleick, 2014: 334). Additionally, the poor water 
infrastructure means that farmers utilize wastewater which, in turn, increases nitrate concentration 
in both surface and groundwater. In 2012, it was estimated that only 25 percent of Syria’s water was 
drinkable which was due to both water pollution and insufficient treatment of wastewater (Mourad 
et. al, 2012: 16). In the same year it was estimated that 78 percent of all groundwater withdrawals in 
Syria were pumped at a rate which exceeds its ability to recharge (Gleick, 2014: 334). Giving the 
necessity of water for both agriculture, domestic use and drinking water, the management and 
practices regarding water are unsustainable at best and at worst might have great consequences for 
the environment of human security. Insufficient agricultural practices means that the lands used for 
cultivation vanishes by loss of arability. The usage of an already limited water supply towards 
cotton production, instead of food production and domestic needs, puts people’s livelihood further 
at risk. Agricultural drought, then, is an apparent issue in Syria as the division of already limited 
water supply is undertaken in a manner that harms, rather than maintains sufficient water sources 
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(cf. Conceptual Framework). Furthermore, it is both caused by the results of natural events and 
human actions e.g. by the policies performed by the Syrian government. 
 
 
An Environment of Human Insecurity 
Due to the onset of meteorological drought, which has prolonged and manifested in the variations of 
agricultural, hydrological and socio-economic drought, the nature of water scarcity in Syria is a 
both a supply-induced and a demand-induced problem. Livelihoods were severely threatened as the 
agricultural sector in Syria suffered continuous blows from the droughts. It resulted in agricultural 
failures affecting around 1.3 million people merely in the eastern regions of Syria in the period 
2006-2009. Of that count, 800.000 lost their livelihoods and sustenance. The importance of water 
not only relates to production of food through irrigation but also household and health, as poor 
hygiene provides conditions for rapid growth and spread of disease (Rijsberman, 2005: 6). There 
are thus several potential water-related threats to the environment of human security, which might 
push people to migrate. 
 
By 2011 it was estimated that between two and three million people across Syria were negatively 
affected by the drought, of which around one million were subject to direct food insecurity. In the 
period of 2011-2012, the FAO's assessment of agriculture and food, found that poverty and food 
insecurity had further increased, estimating that three million people were in "urgent need" of food 
assistance (Gleick, 2014: 334). The drought's impact proved especially devastating for rural farmers 
and herders. By 2009, on average, households had lost 90% of their income while herders had lost 
up to 80% of their flocks (Haysom et al., 2011: 3). Small-scale farmers had been worst affected. 
Many farmers were not able to cultivate enough food or earn enough money to feed their families 
(IRIN, 2010). According to Sirkeci the affected population would be left with two options; either 
they stay and adapt, but risk poverty and starvation, or uproot and seek out more stable conditions 
elsewhere. As established in the Conceptual Framework, there are always multiple and overlapping 
motivation for migration and long-lasting hazards such as drought intersect with  socio-economic, 
political and cultural drivers to increase exposure and vulnerability.  
 
Slow-onset changes in the environment such as drought, allows people more time to consider and 
take steps to avoid, mitigate and adapt to impacts on their homes and livelihoods, which in turn 
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blurs the distinction between voluntary and forced migration (cf. Conceptual Framework). As such, 
the Syrian people’s insecurity is largely a direct result of governance on part of the Syrian regime 
which affects the possibilities for adaption to the water crisis. As the drought continued into its 
second and third year and the affected populations became increasingly vulnerable, the Syrian 
government cancelled a number of state subsidies in 2008 and 2009. This multiplied the price of 
diesel fuel and fertilizer overnight. The lack of social safety nets left many in the agricultural sector 
unable to cope and the rural farmers and their families had few rights and tools to adapt to the 
changing security environment. For many this formed a greater burden than the successive years of 
drought (de Châtel, 2014: 526f). Therefore, it created sufficient push factors, resulting in many 
choosing to abandon their land.  
 
 
Rural to Urban Migration in Syria 
These push factors, led more than 1.5 million people to migrate from rural areas towards the major 
cities in Syria, e.g. Aleppo, Damascus, Dara´a, Hama and Homs (Gleick, 2014: 334). Historically, 
rural farmers have often migrated to urban centers in order to keep their livelihoods stable; 
however, the move has always been a short-term. In the period of 2006-2010, the worsening 
conditions forced entire families, especially from the villages in Northeastern Syria to move 
towards urban areas due to complete lack of food and livelihood security (Haysom et al., 2011: 3). 
These regions were already less developed relatively to the rest of the country. Figures from 2004 
show that the north-eastern regions of Aleppo, Dayr az Zawr, Hassakeh, Idleb and Raqqa had the 
greatest incidence, depth and severity of rural and urban poverty, with 58 percent of Syria’s poor 
concentrated in the region. The poverty rates for these regions continued to rise, even when the 
country as a whole experienced a decline, and the droughts exacerbated this trend (de Châtel, 2014: 
525). Consequently, the northeastern regions saw a large movement of people seeking an 
environment of relatively more human security. 
 
A 2010 report from the United Nations, estimates that people migrated from 160 villages to the 
periphery of cities. Since early 2009, the migration pattern increased dramatically and 65.000 
families had already left their villages by 2010. From this total, 35.000 were from the northeastern 
region of Hassake, and 30.000 from the Dayr az Zawr, Raqqa and Aleppo regions (United Nations, 
2010: 6). Another study found that 60–70 percent of villages in the regions of Hassakeh and Dayr 
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az-Zawr had been deserted in 2009. A large number of the migrants from the northeastern regions 
settled in illegal tent camps near Aleppo’s suburbs, while others migrated further south towards 
Damascus and other southern regions (de Châtel, 2014: 527). 
 
As many countries worldwide, Syria has experienced rapid urbanization. In 2011, 55% of the total 
population was living in urban areas and the number is estimated to rise to 75%  by 2050. However, 
urbanization is not solely a contemporary phenomenon. Between 1955 and 1980 the population of 
Damascus increased from 423.000 to three million and today it is estimated at between four and 
five million. The growth of Damascus has been driven both by natural population growth as well as 
by voluntary and forced migration. For decades, low-skilled economic migrants and rural workers 
have been pulled towards the city. Damascus has also been a place of refuge for stateless Kurds, 
Palestinians and Iraqi refugees, people displaced by drought as well as economic migrants from 
other states (Haysom et al., 2011: 1). There are no exact figures on the total number of drought-
displaced people living in Damascus and on its outskirts. Migrants can often be hard to track and 
many will have assimilated into the urban fabric of Damascus. However, a large number of the 
drought affected people settled in a tent camp in Mzeirieb near Dara’a from 2008 onwards. The 
camp had existed for many years but the droughts meant it expanded substantially (de Châtel, 2014: 
527).  
 
Thus, as suggested in Gleditsch framework, migration was the most prominent outcome of changes 
in the environment. The large number of Syrian families migrated in order to resettle in an 
environment of relatively more human security, however, according to a 2010 UN report, this has 
not been the result for the majority (United Nations, 2010: 6). Instead, they are experiencing 
insecurity in the places of transit and their temporary or permanent destination, highlighting the 
linkages between migration and conflict (cf. conceptual framework). By migrating, many have lost 
social ties and are often exploited at below-market labor rates. A 2011 report finds that many of the 
residents in the camps in the southeastern regions lived under extremely insecure conditions with 
inadequate access to food, basic services and livelihood opportunities. The camps in the north 
likewise lack basic water, sanitation and electricity infrastructure and the migrants are thus in a 
vulnerable position (Haysom et al., 2011: 3). Furthermore the mass-migration has increased the 
strain on the receiving communities, limiting the access for all to the job market, resources and 
public services (United Nations, 2010: 6). The report further argues that inadequate attention was 
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paid to the security of the migrants and the host communities, either by neither national nor 
international actors (Haysom et al., 2011: 21).  
 
According to Gleditsch, this might be a pathway towards conflict. Likewise Sirkeci argues that 
migration can result in increased tensions and conflicts over sharing scarce resources in the places 
of transit and destination. However, it can also lead to increased cooperation and create an 
environment of relative human security, if the right measures are taken. Hence the analysis will turn 
to investigate the potential for conflict or cooperation, with special emphasis on the measures taken 
on by the Syrian authorities, whom according to the principles of national sovereignty have the 
responsibility to protect its citizens. 
 
 
Responding to the Migration Crisis 
There were several drought appeals primarily targeting the populations of the northern regions of 
Dayr az-Zawr, Hassakeh, Homs and Raqqa. Migrants settling in the southern regions initially 
received no aid from the government or international aid agencies. Moreover, the Syrian security 
forces discouraged private Syrian initiatives to help the migrants. In July 2009, UNICEF carried out 
an assessment of 25 tent camps in the Damascus suburbs but no results of the mission were 
published and no one followed up with the provision of aid. Instead, the government tried to 
encourage the migrants to return to their homes in the northeastern parts of Syria, in exchange for 
cash handouts, transport assistance or the promise of aid upon return. However, few took up this 
offer as it did not change the root causes of their initial displacement (de Châtel, 2014: 527). The 
Syrian authorities thus failed to create an environment of human security, and instead tried to turn 
the migrants away, moving towards conflict on Sirkeci’s continuum (cf. Conceptual Framework).   
 
The addition of the migrants to the already dense city, added further risks to the environment of 
human security, as it exacerbated the scarcity of the available water resources. Already in 2006, 
organizations and development agencies called for massive investment if Damascus was to avert a 
critical water crisis. At the time it was estimated that over the past 20 years the level of groundwater 
in the Barada basin, on which Damascus sits, retreated from 50 meters to 200 meters underground. 
Furthermore, over the course of the next 20 years the water table could be down to 400 meters 
below ground level. With an annual precipitation of less than 200mm per year, the Barada river has 
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always been a precious source of water for the city. In addition, it was estimated that the population 
of Damascus could have risen to 10 million making it difficult for farmers and residents to survive 
on the limited water resources. The Syrian government would have to transfer water to Damascus 
from the coast, or from the Euphrates (IRIN, 2006). The Syrian authorities thus needed to react to 
the increasingly scarce water supply, in order to secure both the migrants and the host population. 
However the Syrian government has been accused of downplaying the severity of the drought and 
its humanitarian effects, therefore not living up to its responsibility in managing the drought. For 
instance, the Syrian government’s national drought strategy approved in 2006, was not put to use 
during the drought period. There was even disagreement within the government itself over the 
severity of the drought, which might have inhibited action. In general, the government was keen to 
uphold the image of Syria as a self-sufficient nation. Media coverage of the crisis was thus 
restricted, enabling the Syrian government to construct a narrative of the water crisis in which it is a 
part of a broader context of a global climate crisis, a financial crisis and other external factors, 
beyond its control (de Châtel, 2014: 528).  
 
Francesca de Châtel points to broader security concerns, as an explanation for the construction of 
this narrative. As in many other countries in the water-scarce Middle East, water is considered a 
strategic resource for Syria in regard to its national security. Hence information on water 
availability and use is not accessible to the general public. In Syria, water has become a particularly 
sensitive issue covering all levels of water management. Government officials and water experts 
thus avoid in-depth analysis of the state of the country’s water resources, resulting in only cosmetic 
reforms to the sector (de Châtel, 2014: 528). The institutional framework for water management is 
therefore a fictional arena where plans are outlined on paper but never followed through, goals are 
set but never achieved. This is creating a widespread self-censorship across the Syrian water sector 
and among those working with it (de Châtel, 2014: 529).  
 
On one hand there is then the official narrative from the Syrian government, portraying Syria as a 
naturally water-scarce country actively working to modernize its water sector, but inhibited by 
external factors. On the other hand, the reality on the ground is one of an inefficient, corrupt and 
rigid water management system, enabling overexploitation of resources and contributing to growing 
poverty and disenfranchisement among rural communities (de Châtel, 2014: 529).This  created an 
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environment of relative human insecurity for a large number of people, and might as well have been 
a link in a possible pathway to conflict (cf. Conceptual Framework). 
 
 
The Syrian Uprising  
Multiple scholars have argued for the 2006–10 droughts being a possible trigger for the 2011 
uprising. As established in the Conceptual Framework, the consensus within the field of 
environmental security is that changes in the environment do not lead directly to conflict, but only 
in some instances will be a contributing factor. The water crisis in Syria should be viewed in the 
broader context of many years of resource mismanagement, rapid economic liberalization, abrupt 
cancellation of state subsidies and in general poor governance on behalf of the Syrian government. 
This is especially evident in its failure to address the humanitarian and environmental crisis that had 
been taking shape for more than a decade at the time of the uprising in 2011 (de Châtel, 2014: 532).  
The Syrian uprising that started in March 2011 was sparked by a series of interrelated 
environmental, social, economic and political factors. The many years of resource mismanagement 
and overexploitation caused the depletion of resources, which in turn led to growing 
disenfranchisement and discontent in Syria’s rural communities (de Châtel, 2014: 532). As people 
started to lose their livelihoods and homes and had nowhere to turn for protection, it eroded the 
social contract between citizen and government in the country. This in turn strengthened the case 
for the opposition movement, and damaged the legitimacy of the government (Femia et al., 2012). 
 
In this sense, the drought merely exacerbated an already existing humanitarian crisis as the 
government was not in a position or willing to, sufficiently secure its population (de Châtel, 2014: 
532).  In accordance with Gleditsch’s framework over possible pathways towards conflict, all 
factors are present in the Syrian case (cf. Conceptual Framework). Drought and water scarcity 
changed the environment of security for people in the rural areas, resulting in mass-migration 
towards the cities. People lost their livelihoods and experienced food insecurity resulting in 
additional displacement. The government could not, or would not, grant these migrants the rights 
and protection needed to ensure an environment of relative human security, leading to social 
fragmentation, economic inequality and general dissatisfaction with the political system. Mixed 
with local grievances and conflict, it resulted in increased social unrest, and eventually armed 
escalation of conflict. A more in-depth analysis of the uprising is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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However, the uprising did have further consequences in relations to water scarcity in the country. A 
recent study found that the 2011 uprising's impact on renewable water resources have lowered the 
initial numbers on water scarcity; from the before mentioned 760m³ per capita a year in 2012, it fell 
to below 500 m³, meaning that Syria was experiencing absolute water scarcity (Faour and Fayad, 
2015: 533).  
 
As it was mentioned earlier, Syria’s water crisis cannot be isolated  processes operating at the local 
scale, as Syria shares some of its most important water sources with the neighbor countries. The 
management of these water sources has historically been contentious and the absence of efforts or 
opportunities to address the increasing water scarcity means that it is likely to produce even greater 
risks. Therefore in the region as a whole, the extent of cooperation between the nations on water 
issues is important in ensuring political stability, as the actions of one can affect the other (Gleick, 
2014: 338). As such the following analysis will explore the role of water scarcity in political 
stability on the regional scale, and investigate how the events taking place in Syria affect and is 
affected by processes and patterns in the region. 
 
 
Sub-Conclusion 
Syria has always been a water scarce country, but from 2006-2010 it experienced one of the most 
severe droughts in the country’s history. This particular drought was caused by a mixture of climate 
change, population growth and poor governance, especially in the agricultural sector. Syria was 
largely dependent on its agricultural sector for self-sufficiency and export, therefore the majority of 
Syria’s water has been directed to this sector. However, the agricultural practices and techniques 
were unsustainable and harmful for the environment, further stressing Syria’s already vulnerable 
water supply. Water per capita fell below 760 m³, indicating that the country was experiencing 
water scarcity. This had devastating effects for local food supplies and the agrarian communities. 
Consequently a large number of rural farmers in Northeast Syria lost their livelihoods. As the 
impact of the drought became socio-economic, there was little chance of revitalizing the country’s 
agriculture and much of the rural population was forced to move to urban areas. The sudden 
increase in the urban population further strained the resources in the cities. The migrants were 
pushing the host communities out of the job-market and increasing water scarcity per capita in the 
cities, costing many more their livelihoods. The resulting tensions highlight the Syrian 
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government’s failure to provide an environment for human security for its citizens. The conflicts 
that resulted from the lack of resources, employment etc. are believed to be contributing factors to 
the 2011 uprising. 
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Water Scarcity and Political Stability at the Regional Scale 
This analysis investigates the effects of water scarcity in the Middle East on political stability at the 
regional scale. Political stability, as in the former analysis, refers to potential conflict over access to 
water resources and the migration resulting from its scarcity. The regional scale refers mainly to 
Turkey and Syria, and their geopolitical relations. However, as it will be apparent, the countries are 
interlinked with their neighbors in various ways, hence some mentioning of e.g. Iraq will take place. 
The analysis thus sets out by examining the historical water policies between the countries with 
main focus on the Tigris-Euphrates river basin, which supplies large amount of water to Turkey, 
Syria and Iraq. It then goes on to investigate how transnational migration from Syria into Turkey 
has affected the countries’ relationship. Both aspects are investigated using the theories of human- 
and national security, as well as Sirkeci’s continuum and Gleditsch’s framework (cf. Conceptual 
Framework). 
 
 
The Tigris-Euphrates River Basin 
The Tigris and Euphrates rivers supply the region with the majority of its water resources. They 
descent in the highlands of Turkey, and flow downstream into Syria and Iraq. Both rivers contain 
extensive water management infrastructure and the surface waters provided by the rivers are 
integral to the agricultural economies of the region. Syria, where more than half of its territory is 
desert terrain, obtains as much as 86 percent of its water resources from the Euphrates and other 
rivers that flow into the country from Turkey (Dohrmann et al., 2014: 567). The issues of ownership 
of the waters from the Tigris-Euphrates river basin has linked Turkey, Syria, and Iraq in contentious 
relationships, where each state is trying to maximize their access to water (Dohrmann, 2014: 567). 
Water management in the Tigris-Euphrates River Basin has thus been historically challenging. It 
has dominated the hydro-politics of the region, with struggles between the management decisions of 
the upstream user Turkey and the demands of the downstream Syria and Iraq (Maddock et al., 
2015). 
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Figure 4: A map of the Tigris-Euphrates rivers. 
 
(The Economist, 2015) 
 
As it was established in the former analysis, the region is prone to water scarcity. However in recent 
decades, it has become apparent that with rising global temperatures, water is going to become an 
even scarcer resource in areas like the Middle East. As mentioned in the introduction of the thesis, a 
study ranking the most water stressed countries in the world by 2040, found that 14 out of the 33 
countries at highest risk is located in the Middle East (Maddock et al., 2015). In addition, the 
Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE) have documented water loss via satellites 
operated by NASA and Germany’s Aerospace Center. Based on their data, several scientists have 
suggested that water-related conflict could be brewing on the Euphrates river bank. GRACE 
measured groundwater usage between 2003 and 2009 and found that the Tigris-Euphrates basin is 
losing water faster than any other place in the world except northern India. During those six years, 
143km3 of stored freshwater vanished from the region as a result of dwindling rainfall and poor 
water management policies (Voss, 2013: 904). Given water’s importance, its scarcity can 
potentially complicate the relationship between the states that must obtain their needed commodities 
from a shared source. However it can also lead to increased cooperation. The following sections 
will examine the case in the Turkish-Syrian relationship. 
 
 
Cooperation or Conflict In a Transboundary Setting 
Two major issues complicate and constrain Turkey and Syria in addressing the water issue in a 
transboundary setting. First, there is virtually no existence of transboundary institutions, and the 
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few existing institutions do not represent coherent, robust and flexible structures to regulate the 
different uses of water resources (Kibaroglu et al., 2015: 825). Second, there are no formal water 
allocation rights for either surface or groundwater. At the core of this dilemma are underlying 
differences in the interpretation of international water laws, including its applicability to 
groundwater and to surface-groundwater interactions. These differences in interpretation severely 
limit the potential for any agreement for legal allocations or management policies for the Tigris and 
Euphrates rivers (Maddock et al., 2015). 
 
Turkey has largely followed the Harmon Doctrine, claiming that since both rivers originate within 
its borders, it gives it sovereign rights over the water. The position taken by Syria and Iraq, 
however, is that the Euphrates and Tigris are international rivers and both countries believe they 
have acquired rights to the waters, as their inhabitants have used the waters with unrestricted access 
for thousands of years. Furthermore, the countries argue that their respective water and irrigation 
systems provide a further reason for their acquired rights (Dohrmann et al., 2014: 575). A general 
prerequisite for cooperation is political willingness to reconcile and share benefits, which 
historically has not been present. The countries have thus not been able or willing to agree on a 
trilateral arrangement. Instead, they have adopted competitive water policy approaches at the 
national level, and have failed to coordinate and strike a balance between the various uses of the 
scarce resource (Kibaroglu et al., 2015: 826). In order to understand the reasons for these 
competitive relations, the following sections will go into detail with the history of the water policies 
in the region. 
 
 
An Era of Tensions; The Greater Anatolia Project 
Political confrontation, rising tensions and economic disintegration characterized much of what 
occurred from the 1960s to the turn of the millennium, in terms of the relations between Turkey, 
Iraq and Syria. Especially the Turkish-Syrian relationship has been one of antagonism and a mutual 
distrust, and the countries had tense bilateral relations in all matters including the usage of water. 
These tensions stem from a range of both historical and current problems, including being on the 
different poles during the Cold War (Dohrmann et al., 2014: 579, Aras et al., 2015: 198). 
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During the Cold War, the countries adopted unilateral economic growth policies to develop the 
Euphrates and Tigris waters and land resources for food- and energy security, without coordination 
or cooperation amongst each other (Dohrmann et al., 2015: 579). The countries thus acted based on 
own national interests and gains, thus creating an environment of conflict and relative human 
insecurity by not considering the security of people in other places (cf. Conceptual Framework). 
Namely, the projects undertaken in the Southeastern Anatolian region of Turkey, Turkey's Greater 
Anatolia Project (GAP), increased tension among the nations. The GAP involves Turkey acting 
unilaterally to construct over 20 dams on both the Tigris and Euphrates rivers (Maddock et al., 
2015). 
 
The stated goal of GAP was to harness the power of the rivers, to provide hydroelectricity for 
Turkey. This was done in order to expand the agricultural land and to increase the productivity and 
prosperity of the southeastern Anatolian region. This region had significantly lagged behind the rest 
of the country in social and economic development. Another stated goal was to increase agricultural 
trade across the Middle East, and to provide social and economic development. However, so far 
GAP has only served to increase hydroelectric power generation within Turkey itself (Dohrmann et 
al., 2014: 568, 573, Voss, 2013: 904). 
 
 
Effects of the GAP 
Regardless of its stated goals, the GAP and its intensive infrastructure development has 
significantly altered the Tigris-Euphrates basin in many ways (Maddock et al., 2015). As such, the 
GAP poses a potential issue in terms of Turkish foreign relations, as it could cause a significant loss 
of water, in both quality and quantity, to the downstream states of Syria and Iraq. Before the dam 
projects, Turkey consumed approximately ten percent of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. By 
the completion of the GAP, the number is expected to become over 50 percent. Such a drastic 
reduction in the discharge of water out of Turkey means that dams in the northern part of Syria will 
suffer a severe reduction in the production of hydroelectric power (Dohrmann et al., 2014: 574). 
This has already in many areas of Syria led to a gradual, or in some cases rapid, decrease in the 
amount of available water, which has led to power outages, a lack of utility and drinking water 
(Vidal, 2015; al-Masri, 2015). Iraq could suffer from even lower water quantity as Syria most likely 
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will further reduce the amount of water flowing downstream, in order to satisfy its own needs 
(Dohrmann et al., 2014: 574). 
 
The decrease in available water is already evident. One study estimates that since 1975, Turkey’s 
dam and hydropower constructions have cut water flow to Syria by 40 percent and Iraq by 80 
percent. In response, Syria and Iraq have accused Turkey of hoarding water (Hammer, 2013). The 
GAP thus stands as an example of the consequences of conducting water policies based on national 
security concerns. Whilst the Turkish state gains access to more water it is not considered how it 
might render vulnerable people insecure in other places. The GAP even allows Turkey to cut water 
flowing downstream at short notice. This has happened on different occasions during the 1990s, 
where Syria and Iraq were given little or no notice and time to adapt. Turkey’s downstream 
neighbors are then faced with a situation where long-term water supplies are in danger and at the 
same time, there is a very real threat of short-term shortages and stoppages from a fickle neighbor 
(Dohrmann et al., 2014: 574). However, the turn of the millennium brought a new era of 
rapprochement and cooperation between the countries. In this phase the countries could thus 
potentially ensure an environment of relatively more human security, across the borders of the 
nation-states. 
 
 
The Rapprochement Phase 
Intense negotiations and cooperation in security, economic, and cultural fields lead first to a 
normalization and then to rapprochement between Turkey and Syria in which the parties developed 
a preliminary understanding for regional economic cooperation (Kibaroglu et al., 2015: 831; Aras et 
al., 2015: 198). Furthermore, Turkey initiated a new foreign policy approach trying to appropriate 
the role of ‘order establishing country’, in other words to serve as regional hegemon. The Turkish 
foreign policy makers were thus aiming at de-securitizing traditional foreign policy problems and 
threats, by pursuing active diplomacy and introducing new soft policy instruments such as trade 
relations and cultural cooperation. Syria might be seen as a test case of these strategies as the 
potentials for broadening cooperation with Iraq and Iran was more limited at the time (ibid: 199f). 
 
Thus in the 2000s, the governments in Turkey embarked on a number of cooperative foreign policy 
initiatives with its southern neighbors (Kibaroglu et al., 2015: 831). In this context Turkey and Iraq, 
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and Turkey and Syria, signed a Joint Political Declaration on the Establishment of the High-Level 
Strategic Cooperation Council (HSCC) in 2008. The main aims underlying the establishment of 
both the Turkish–Syrian and Turkish–Iraqi HSCC’s were to broaden the scope of the cooperation 
agenda to take in sectors of socio-economic development. This included water, energy and food, as 
well as simultaneously fostering a situation of regional interdependence (Kibaroglu et al., 2015: 
832).  
 
At the first Turkish-Syrian HSCC meeting held in Damascus in 2009, the countries signed 50 
protocols, four of which concerned regional waters. It marked a significant turning point, where the 
countries rather than arguing over their respective water shares, focused on common issues in 
transboundary water management and use. It was the first official agreements concluded by the two 
countries on the protection of the environment, water quality management, water efficiency, 
drought management and flood protection. Furthermore, the agreements were the first actual 
attempt to address the adverse effects of climate change.  
 
By 2009 the two countries, that had previously adopted rigid positions on their water rights, were 
now openly discussing new and efficient methods for managing the supply of and demand for water 
for different domestic uses (ibid: 833). The Turkish-Syrian relations were thus in fact moving along 
Sirkeci’s continuum, towards more cooperation and as such an environment of human security for 
the many people depending on the water from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. However the 
implementation of the water agreements between Turkey and Syria was hindered by a number of 
processes operating on the local and regional scale, especially the uprising in Syria which will be 
elaborated on in the following section. 
 
 
The End Of Cooperation – Outbreak Of The Syrian Civil War 
The outbreak of civil war in Syria and the spread of instability in Iraq, put strain on the bilateral as 
well as trilateral relations among the countries. Across the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, illegal non-
state actors had taken control complicating or completely putting an end to official cooperation 
(Kibaroglu et al., 2015: 827). In addition, Turkey was forced to deal with the large number of 
refugees crossing their borders, potential influx of militants and Syrian Kurds establishing a 
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semiautonomous region; processes and their spillovers all posing potential threats to their 
southeastern borders (Dohrmann et al., 2014: 569) 
 
Increasingly the mass influx of Syrian refugees was and is putting pressure on the Turkish-Syrian 
border regions. According to the UNHCR, the number of refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey is 
expected to rise to nearly 1.9 million in 2015, 1.7 million of which originates from Syria (UNHCR, 
2015b). Turkey is by 2015 thus hosting the largest number of Syrian refugees. A report from the 
European Commission estimates that around 220.000 of the refugees live in 22 camps located in ten 
southeastern provinces of Turkey. As of June 2014 Turkey, with the assistance of UNHCR, had 
registered approximately 580.000 non-camp Syrian refugees, and many more are thought to be in 
Turkey unregistered (European Commission, 2014: 65). Beside the large influx of Syrians, Turkey 
is also hosting refugees originating from Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran, further straining the capacity of 
the Turkish authorities (UNHCR, 2015b). 
 
As seen in the former analysis, migration is often closely interlinked with conflict and the following 
section will thus investigate the Turkish response to the Syrian refugee crisis and, how it has 
affected their geopolitical relations. However, before this can be investigated in detail, the 
motivations and patterns of Syrian migration will be outlined and discussed. 
 
 
Triggers and Patterns of Transnational Migration 
As outlined in the former analysis, there are almost always multiple motivations and drivers related 
to migration. It is as well important to note that Syrian migration is not a new phenomenon 
(Yazgan, et al., 2015: 184). An unstable political environment in Syria e.g. due to a number of 
military coups has long motivated people to seek an environment of relatively more human security. 
In addition economic motivations have influenced migration patterns from Syria. The trend 
especially intensified in the second half of the 1970s as job opportunities in the oil producing 
countries of the Middle East increased. Thus until 2011, the literature concerning Syrian migration 
mainly emphasized economic consideration and motivations. However 2011 was a turning point, as 
both the volume and nature of migration from Syria changed dramatically, complicating the picture 
(Yazgan et al., 2015: 185). The ongoing civil war in Syria created an environment of insecurity for 
many people, either forcing them or motivating them to leave. However problems of 
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unemployment, income inequality, suppression of minorities, suppression of opposition (ibid: 183), 
and as pointed out in the former analysis; issues relating to drought and water scarcity are important 
factors to take into account. Especially in the face of slow-onset environmental changes like the 
drought in Syria the motivations behind migration are blurred. Hence the root causes of Syrian 
migration are multiple and unlikely to disappear soon, which might serve as an explanation to why 
people chose to migrate across borders. It is not unusual for displaced people to move a number of 
times, whether in response to threats or opportunities that arise over time as they seek to end the 
insecurity and uncertainty of their displacement and re-establish their homes and livelihoods 
(IDMC, 2015: 16f). While the vast majority of people who flee disasters remain within their 
country of residence, all these factors might create an environment of human insecurity with enough 
push-factors to urge displaced people to seek protection and assistance abroad.  
 
As argued by Sirkeci, all migration is caused by conflict, this also goes for the second, third, and 
hundredth time people migrate. Migration thus changes in response to new challenges en route and 
in destinations (cf. Conceptual Framework). As shown in the former analysis, Syria saw a large 
movement of people from rural to urban areas. This resulted among other things from the drought. 
While this might have been the cause of their initial displacement; new threats might serve as new 
motivators for further migration. These threats could be posed by lack of capacity or will on behalf 
of the government to ensure their rights and general security, or by the rise of armed conflict in the 
country. Displacement is thus often long lasting, occurring in repeated cycles or both (IDMC, 2015: 
16).  
 
It is thus important to factor in how potential conflicts arise as people move between borders. 
Conflict situations can be identified at various scales and stages of international migration process. 
Once migrants or refugees cross an international border, it can lead to conflict between states. 
Border crossing is according to Sirkeci a crucial issue as borders are increasingly militarized and 
tightened. It follows the idea of national sovereignty and the mainstream conceptualization of 
security; where national territory is to be protected from external threats, in this case the threat of 
the “other” migrating into “our places”. Sirkeci therefore fears that this preoccupation with national 
sovereignty and protection might be at the expense of human lives (cf. Conceptual Framework). 
Accordingly, transnational spaces are characterized by conflict potentials. With this in mind, it will 
50 
 
now be investigated how Turkey is responding to the influx of Syrian refugees and how it is 
influencing its geopolitical relations with its neighbor.  
 
 
Responding To The Syrian Crisis: Diplomacy 
According to Ela Aras and Zeynep Mencutek, Turkey’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis 
occurred in three phases; diplomacy, confrontation and defense (Aras et al., 2015: 200). These will 
be investigated in detail in the following sections. At the very beginning of the protests in Syria, 
Turkey pursued diplomatic ways. Turkey thus tried to use their close bilateral economic and 
political relations to convince the Syrian regime and President Assad to take necessary steps for 
reform. Furthermore, Turkey adopted an “open door policy”, welcoming all Syrian refugees. They 
were considered as guests and granted protection under a “temporary protection regime” (ibid: 201). 
It provided the Syrians with the right to temporary asylum, until resettling in a third safe country. 
Initially Turkey also rejected international assistance for its humanitarian effort, as it wanted to 
prove that it could deal with the matters politically and economically on its own, thereby proving 
itself as capable of being the regional hegemon (ibid: 202). This approach towards Syrians 
represents a position in Sirkeci’s continuum towards cooperation, and thus the creation of a relative 
environment of human security, where the refugees were granted rights and protection. 
 
While the initial steps taken by Turkey was praised and admired it could not keep up its diplomatic 
approach. The government mistakenly assumed that the Assad regime would soon collapse and that 
the refugees would then return to Syria. In September 2011, President Erdogan even called on 
Assad to leave the post and recognized the Syrian National Council as the official representative of 
the Syrian opposition (Aras et al., 2015: 202). A war of words followed, where the Syrian regime 
accused the Turkish government of supporting the Syrian opposition groups. Furthermore, Turkey’s 
“open door policy” was suspected to be a cover for granting refuge to rebels as well as arming and 
training them in Turkey. The Turkish government denied the allegations, and in addition accused 
the Syrian regime of massacring its own citizens and destroying the cultural heritage of Turks 
(Kibaroglu et al., 2015: 834). This marked a turning point of the diplomatic relations, resulting in 
withdrawal of diplomatic representations and cancelling of free trade agreements between Syria and 
Turkey. The countries thus sharpened their rhetoric towards each other and concerned themselves 
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with the protection of their national territories; which could be at the expense of human lives and 
political stability in the region. 
 
 
At the Brink of Confrontation 
Amid such tense relations, by late-2011 several violent incidents at the Turkish-Syrian border 
brought the countries to the brink of confrontation. It prompted a debate in Turkey about whether 
the Turkish military should carry out cross-border operations as retaliation (ibid: 200; Kibaroglu et 
al., 2015: 834). Instead, Turkey decided to shift to a “zero point delivery” strategy in order to slow 
down the arrivals of refugees.  
 
This happened for a number of reasons. Firstly, with the souring relations between the countries, the 
Turkish government found it increasingly difficult to gain approval from the Syrian government to 
provide assistance inside Syria. Secondly, Turkey’s support to Syrian opposition became apparent 
and thirdly, Turkish security authorities grew increasingly concerned over losing control over 
Turkey’s border with Syria, due to the violent spillovers from the Syrian war. To avoid infringing 
Syria’s national sovereignty and to protect its own domestic territory, Turkey resorted to delivering 
aid to border crossings (Aras et al., 2015: 204). Furthermore, the Turkish government planned a 
relocation of a group of Sunni refugees from the Hatay province, located in the Southeastern 
Turkey, to other provinces. This was in response to negative reactions from Turkish citizens to the 
increasing number of Syrians in the country, as well as outright clashes between the groups. The 
unrest highlights how migration and conflict are interlinked. Tensions rise when the host 
community grows increasingly frustrated with the refugee population and the effects they have on 
the socio-economic environment.  
 
The large number of refugees thus created tensions both within and between the two countries, 
making both resort to approaches and discourses that fits more within the concepts of national 
security. By moving further towards conflict on Sirkeci’s continuum, human security is 
compromised and political stability can be fragile if tension continues to escalate. Perhaps as an 
acknowledgement of the dangers of their confrontational relations, Turkey entered the final stage of 
their response. 
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A Long Lasting Crisis: The Defense Phase 
As Turkey realized that the Syrian crisis was a long-lasting issue, they entered the defense phase. 
By mid-2013 there was still no sign of military intervention in Syria; Turkey realized it could not 
act alone in trying to control the civil war in Syria. It was at this stage that Turkey finally asked the 
international community for assistance (Aras et al., 2015: 204). Furthermore the large number of 
refugees in Turkey started to have visible economic consequences, especially for the Southern 
Anatolia region bordering Syria, which was already relatively underdeveloped. One study 
investigating seven southern regions found that unemployment rate rose above the Turkey average 
in most regions(Bahcekapili et al., 2015). Another 2013 study likewise saw the highest 
unemployment rates in the southeastern regions, with an average rate of 14 percent. Some provinces 
experienced rates as high as 21.1 percent, which is a significant difference compared to the more 
western regions of Turkey with unemployment rates at 4.7 percent (Dohrmann et al., 2014: 573). 
Furthermore, internal migration rate increased, which might be a result of refugees creating an 
environment of human insecurity for the host population (Bahcekapili et al., 2015). In other words, 
the refugees competed against the local workforce and deprived the natives of their jobs, in turn 
causing more migration.  
 
Another 2013 study by Istanbul’s Bahçeşehir University also found that the southeastern region had 
significantly higher rates of “materially deprived” children: 80.9 percent compared to 50–55 percent 
in western areas (Dohrmann et al., 2014: 573). The overall conclusion of the studies was thus that 
the large number of people temporarily added to Turkey put the its citizens in a disadvantaged 
situation in terms of income per capita. Furthermore, it was deduced by looking at growth figures 
that the refugees did not contribute to the growth of the Turkish economy (Bahcekapili et al., 2015). 
Consequently Turkey started to ask for burden sharing and adopting an economization discourse on 
refugees. 
 
Starting from 2014, Turkey thus returned to its traditional tougher refugee policies and adopted an 
unofficial “close door” policy and strict registration of Syrian refugees. This meant that in order to 
obtain rights and services refugees had to register (Aras et al., 2015: 205). Once registered, refugees 
were offered free access to health and education service. However the legal status of the great 
majority of these refugees remained unclear, which limited their employment opportunities. Non-
camp refugees as well faced considerable challenges in accessing essential services and rights 
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unless they registered, and very often their living conditions were difficult (European Commission, 
2015: 65). While Turkey has not officially closed its borders, Human Rights Watch reported that 
Syrian refugees were beaten, detained and pushed back across the border into Syria. As such, they 
reported that many Syrians were using smugglers in order to enter Turkey unregistered (Human 
Rights Watch, 2015). 
 
The continuous influx of refugees from Syria has then resulted in Turkey increasingly fortifying 
their borders and moving along Sirkeci’s continuum towards conflict and an environment of relative 
human insecurity for the refugees. This changing response is as well a result of an environment of 
increased human insecurity for the host population, struggling to share resources, jobs and the like. 
The immigration of Syrians did not only create tension and conflict at the local scale, e.g. in the 
Hatay province, but also on a regional scale between Turkey and Syria, who increasingly resorted to 
more securitization and protection of domestic spaces, which ironically have created more tensions 
and put the countries on brink of confrontation (Aras et al., 2015: 205). It highlights how 
international migration is an important theme in foreign policy and how transnational migration is 
increasingly becoming a national security concern for Turkey. As regional tensions rise, Turkey 
might be facing new threats to its national security, e.g. through its water resources. The final 
section of this analysis, will investigate how water is used by both Turkey and Syria as a strategic 
measure in ensuring national gains and security. 
 
 
Using Water As A Tool Of War 
The current state of affairs between Turkey and Syria is not at all conducive to cooperation and the 
Turkish government still does not recognize the legitimacy of Assad’s presidency. It is thus hard to 
predict whether Turkey’s relations with Syria will go back to the relatively good pre-2011 state, and 
whether the water protocols that have been signed only a few years ago have a chance to be 
implemented. Added to the tense situation is another development obstructing the coordinated 
management of the river basin; the ongoing spread of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
across the region, seizing control over strategic water structures. 
As mentioned earlier, the GAP has had a profound effect on the day to day life of many Syrians and 
Iraqis. It has even been speculated that the water scarcity induced partly by the dams have become a 
motivating factor for many who join ISIS. As was outlined in the former analysis, the devastating 
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drought in Syria, dwindling water resources and chronic mismanagement resulted in the following 
migration of approximately 1.5 million people, who had lost their livelihoods. As Aron Wolf, a 
water management expert at Oregon State University, explains: ”You had a lot of angry, 
unemployed men helping to trigger a revolution” (Hammer, 2013). Water is thus a central feature 
of the ongoing tensions. The various factions in the Syrian civil war have been opening and closing 
dams for strategic purposes and water is used as a weapon, be it as a means of extortion or as a cost 
effective means of demolition. As such, in May 2014, Turkey began to gradually reduce the flow of 
Euphrates water for six days before stopping the flow altogether by the middle of June. The result 
has been a reduction of 1.6 billion m3 in Lake Assad in Northern Syria and the nearby hydroelectric 
power station has been forced to cut back on its operation of eight turbines down to three. These 
actions taken by the Turkish government indicate that it will use water as one of many tools in 
formulating its policy in the region to its own advantages (Dohrmann et al., 2014: 573). In this case 
to harm a potential enemy, despite the actions might affect civilians. 
An overarching issue is however, that the lack of water will have further negative impacts on 
agricultural production and energy generation, resulting in vulnerable people losing their 
livelihoods thus creating more displacement. By prioritizing national security and gains over 
regional cooperation and human security, the current situation is creating an environment of 
insecurity, for the individual and for the states. Turkey might be trying to protect its domestic 
territory and sovereignty by taking on national security measures towards its neighbors. However 
the countries in the region, if not the entire world, are interconnected and an environment of human 
insecurity is likely to spillover to other places; being it through human mobility patterns or the 
responses from one actor to another’s actions, e.g. closing off vital water supply.  
 
Furthermore, there are significant global processes at play which should not be ignored. As it has 
been established, both Syria, Turkey and other countries in the Middle East are affected by 
environmental changes, some of which is argued to be the result of climate change. It is therefore 
important to understand that the situation in Syria and in the Syrian-Turkish case, is a specific 
constellation of processes and patterns from multiple scales intersecting in a certain way. This will 
be elaborated on and discussed in the final analytical chapter of this thesis, where water scarcity’s 
effect on political stability at the global scale is examined. 
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Sub-Conclusion 
As discussed in the first analysis, water scarcity in the Middle East has had severe consequences for 
Syria’s political, economic and social stability, and might have been a driver for opposition and the 
2011 uprising. Turkey is likewise experiencing water scarcity. However, the Turkish government 
has been able to manage the resources in a way, which have ensured a higher degree of security for 
its population, e.g. through the Greater Anatolia Project. While the GAP ensured national gains and 
security, it affected the flow of water to Syria and Iraq; putting individuals’ livelihoods at risk.  
 
Historically, Turkish-Syrian water-relations have always been tense. However at the turn of the 
century the countries started approaching each other and broaden the scope of regional cooperation. 
Yet the good relations were brought to an end with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. Initially, 
Turkey sought diplomatic solutions and aided Syrians affected by the war, but withdrew when the 
conflict grew beyond their capabilities and presented a risk to its own national security. The 
countries came to the brink of confrontation and Turkey started to fortify its borders, thus creating 
an environment of human insecurity for the Syrian refugees. Migration is often interlinked with 
conflict and can create tensions between nation-states when migrants cross borders. At least insofar 
as immigrants will be viewed as “outsiders”, not belonging, and potentially carrying with them 
traces from the violence they flee from. Moreover, the Turkish government is responsible for the 
refugees it is hosting, and therefore responsible for supplying resources, such as water, straining the 
already scarce resource. Turkey has experienced such conflict over the right to resources in local 
communities in its southeastern regions. Furthermore it applied nationalist border and water 
policies, as the Syrian crisis proved long-lasting. Water then is an important denominator of the 
tensions and insecurities present on the regional scale, as it is an absolute necessity for everyone 
and by extension a potent political tool. Turkey has in fact used its control over the flow of water 
into Syria as a foreign policy tool, both historically and contemporarily. Thus it is evident that the 
nationalist water and security policies conducted by Turkey, puts the Syrian population at a 
crossroads at different times and for different reasons. The Syrians dependent on the waters from 
the Tigris-Euphrates rivers might find themselves without water at any time. Furthermore the 
refugees from the civil war are caught in a diplomatic juncture. Turkey changes its foreign policy in 
accordance with its own interests and what it perceives as potential threats to its security. The 
events unfolding in Syria, as well as the countries’ responses to it, create tensions on a local scale, 
but increasingly also between the nation-states, potentially upsetting regional stability. 
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Water Scarcity and Political Stability at the Global Scale 
This chapter serves as both an analysis of the effects of water scarcity in the Middle East on 
political stability at the global scale, but also as a discussion of how scales intersect to create 
specific outcomes. As established in the thesis, climate change is materialized predominantly as 
water scarcity in the Middle Eastern region, affecting both Syria and Turkey in various ways. It will 
be investigated how these regional patterns of a larger global climatic process affect other areas of 
the region in which Syria resides and how the events unfolding in Syria might exacerbate water 
scarcity and conflict in this context. Furthermore, it will be investigated how tensions, conflict and 
migration in the region might spillover to the global scale. In conclusion  it will be discussed how 
the international community can and is responding to these possible challenges, how security 
concepts apply and whether it will affect global political stability. 
The concept of scales is therefore important to keep in mind throughout this final chapter. While the 
thesis has aimed to sort different patterns and processes according to their scale of operation; most 
operate on multiple scales at once, and intersect with one another in various ways. The concept of 
scales is thus by no means a fixed construct, but a fluid and mutually intersecting one (cf. 
Conceptual Framework). The socio-spatial dialectic is thus crucial in understanding the events 
unfolding in Syria and elsewhere, as the world is interconnected in various social, economic, 
political and environmental ways, both intended and unintended. Global processes, such as climate 
change and broader political relations in the region impact on Syria and likewise the events and 
agency happening in Syria impact on the its neighbors and the rest of the world. The following 
section thus sets out by highlighting how global processes of climate change is not just affecting 
Syria, but have effects all across the world in specific ways, and especially in other parts of the 
region. That is not to say that climate change is the only cause of water scarcity in the Middle East, 
as it is not. Instead the aim is to highlight how there are global patterns which can potentially render 
a large amount of people insecure across the world. This is done in order to later establish that 
changes in the environment cannot easily be handled by national security measures. 
 
Global Processes Of Climate Change 
With the mounting evidence for climate change it has become apparent that many areas, specifically 
those around the Equator, will become decidedly less habitable if not completely uninhabitable due 
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to high temperatures or water levels alone (Reuveny, 2015). Higher temperatures and water scarcity 
can lead to irreversible environmental degradation. Poor management of water and land resources 
already poses a significant threat to the biodiversity in many areas around the world. This can be 
heightened by relative resource scarcity and environmental damage. As the biodiversity of a given 
area is reduced, the arability of the area decreases and the population and crops can become more 
susceptible to infectious disease (Jantz et al., 2015). With global populations being on the rise, the 
need for arable land is greater than ever. The loss of habitable and arable places consequently will 
render a large number of people insecure, which in effect could force and motivate human 
migration, as in the case of Syria. 
As established previously, water scarcity in Syria is largely a result of poor governance and 
mismanagement of resources. However, as the Syrian authorities liked to frame the water crisis, 
external factors play a part. These might not be external as much as they are global processes of 
climate and environmental changes, affecting all scales of human life, in the Middle East in the 
form of decreasing water levels and precipitation. 
 
Water scarcity in the Middle East 
The issues with access to sufficient quantity and quality of water is however not isolated to Syria 
and Turkey, but has merely been the scope of the previous analyses (Maddock et al., 2015). As 
established in previous chapters, 14 of the 33 most water stressed countries in 2040 are in the 
Middle East. This includes nine countries considered extremely stressed with a score of 5.0 out of 
5.0: Bahrain, Kuwait, Palestine, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Oman and 
Lebanon. The region thus faces exceptional water-related challenges in the future as it is already 
one of the least water-secure in the world (ibid.). These global processes of climate and 
environmental changes are thus affecting the Middle Eastern region in a specific way, which goes 
beyond national borders. While water scarcity in Syria is a unique case in relations to its specific 
political, economic and social geography, it is still largely influenced by these global processes. 
Thus, in order to understand how the water scarcity affecting the region is not just isolated to Syria, 
the next section will briefly examine its impacts in Jordan. The section will as well open up for a 
discussion of how water scarcity in Jordan is influenced by the Syrian crisis and might escalate into 
something on a larger scale.  
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Water Scarcity in Jordan 
Jordan is a partly arid and semi-arid country and has naturally low water availability. Yet over the 
last decades climate change has caused a decline in precipitation and hence surface water flows. 
Jordan is thus expected to experience severe drought conditions in the future (Schyns et al., 2015). 
The current water demand in Jordan already exceeds the limited renewable water resources 
available in the country. Thus, such future meteorological droughts can have devastating effects (cf. 
Conceptual Framework). 
The water scarcity in Jordan is, as in the case of the Syrian-Turkish relationship, also a matter of 
lack of transnational management and cooperation. Jordan shares some of its main sources of water 
with Syria and Israel, which due to lack of agreements has been depleted by over-consumption. 
Despite of some water agreements between the nations, continued tensions over the shared water 
resources persist. Jordan and Syria have recently argued over construction and operation of Syrian 
dams on one of the shared rivers. In 2012, The Jordan Times reported that Syria violated their water 
agreements, thereby depriving Jordan of its legitimate water share (ibid.). As in the Syrian-Turkish 
case, the relations between the countries are moving towards conflict rather than cooperation, 
illustrating just how important water is in national security concerns. On top of this, Jordan has 
experienced large influxes of refugees as a result of the ongoing conflict in Syria. This only 
increases Jordan’s struggle to meet domestic water needs and might result in more conflict. As 
such, Jordan is experiencing similar tensions over water resources, which consequently can push a 
lot of people into an environment of human insecurity (cf. Conceptual Framework). 
The ongoing violence and political turmoil going on in the region is commanding global attention, 
and in this context water therefore may seem tangential. However, as the analysis of political 
stability at the local scale shows that drought and water scarcity in Syria might have been a 
contributing factor in the 2011 uprising. Likewise, tensions may rise in Jordan and elsewhere, as 
water scarcity is a serious concern and an important component of political stability. 
This section thus showed how water scarcity is not isolated to Syria and Turkey, but is very much 
an issue in other countries in the Middle East. Emphasis has been put on Jordan, who is facing a 
looming water crisis, which could be severely exacerbated by spillover effects from the Syrian 
crisis. Either in the form of direct violence, or most prominently, the mass influx of refugees from 
Syria, which can bring with them conflict and tensions over resources. This will be further 
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investigated in the following section, thus highlighting how the events in Syria can  have 
consequences for political stability on a much larger global scale.  
  
Local Processes Affecting the Global Scale  
In a region already hosting millions of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, the Syrian crisis is putting 
immense additional strains on the resources and capacities of all the neighboring countries (Zetter et 
al., 2014: 6). Lebanon and Jordan, both bordering Syria, are currently hosting a large amount of 
refugees. Lebanon is in fact the country in the world hosting the largest amount of refugees relative 
to its population size (UNHCR, 2015c). Hence, as observed in Turkey in the previous analysis, the 
Syrian refugees increasingly impact upon the country's economic, social and political environment.  
On a macroeconomic scale, it includes losses in terms of economic performance, public revenue 
and taxes, profits, private consumption and investment, as well as declining growth rates and 
increasing unemployment across the region. The World Bank estimates that the Syrian crisis has 
resulted in a decline in Lebanon’s GDP rate, from an expected 4.4 percent to 2.9 percent per year as 
well as halved foreign direct investments. This constitutes a large socio-economic impact; as 
government spending is depressed by $1.5 billion, while there is an increase in demand and spends 
of public services with the increased population (Zetter et al., 2014: 7). Furthermore, there have 
been severe disruptions in the regional trading patterns. This long-term dislocation of international 
trade will further exacerbate declining investment, rising unemployment, and commodity shortages 
in the region (Zetter et al., 2014: 7). The spillover of Syrian refugees is thus rendering the host 
population increasingly insecure, as their government is struggling to provide the needed resources 
and protection.  
On a microeconomic level, the large influx of refugees means that rent levels are rising which 
consequently pressures the local population out of the market (Zetter et al., 2014: 8). Furthermore 
the refugees are causing spikes in unemployment, resulting in depressed wage rates and limited 
employment opportunities for both refugees and host population. In Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq 
around 30 percent of the working age refugee population are in some form of sporadic, irregular 
and unskilled paid employment. The increased competition for work result in local disputes and 
many people are being forced into the informal sector, where they have few workers’ rights. The 
government of Lebanon and Jordan has tried to accommodate these tensions and conflicts by 
60 
 
demanding that Syrian refugees obtain a worker’s permit. This however severely limits the 
opportunities for the refugee population and thus many still choose informal work. Thus despite the 
official restrictions on work refugees still gain employment. The surge in labor supply has had 
enormous effects on the labor markets, in turn resulting in increased market prices for basic 
commodities (Zetter et al., 2014: 6ff). The overall picture is thus one of increased insecurity, as the 
refugees pose a threat to the host population’s livelihoods. 
Not only is the host population facing unemployment, possible loss of their homes and failing 
government support, the refugee population is also affecting the scarce supply of water. In the 
northern part of Jordan, some cities have more than doubled in population size, which is putting 
immense strain on the water resources and infrastructure. The authorities in the area have imposed 
restriction of water which means that in some areas water is only supplied for a couple of hours 
once a week. Consequently, a large amount of Jordanians and refugees, are experiencing extreme 
water insecurity, which has resulted in tensions and sometimes even violence between the groups 
(Schyns et al., 2015, Al Jazeera, 2015).  
As a result, there is growing hostility towards the refugees. The long-lasting crisis has thus strained 
the solidarity, not only of Turkey but also Lebanon and Jordan. In response to cross-border 
violence, mass influx of people and other potential threats Lebanon has had periodic border 
closures. Additionally both Lebanon and Jordan have imposed strict access restrictions, which 
regularly deny Iraqi refugees from Syria and other groups from entering the countries without 
identity papers, which many refugees do not have (Zetter et al., 2014: 9). Thus, as in the Turkish-
Syrian case, relations are becoming more tense as the crisis shows no sign of abating. By closing 
borders, refugees are experiencing increased insecurity. Likewise local conflict over water 
resources is creating an environment of human insecurity for both refugees and the host 
communities. This is an example of how global processes, in this case climate change, intersect 
with spillovers originating at the local scale and create a tense and insecure environment in specific 
places.  
The growing animosity from a host community could potentially create an environment of relative 
human insecurity, with enough push-factors to force or motivate additional migration. This was 
seen in the former analysis, where internal migration rates rose in the southern provinces of Turkey. 
Furthermore Syrian refugees are already migrating in large numbers beyond the Middle Eastern 
region (cf. Introduction). The next section will therefore turn to how the water crisis in the Middle 
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East and the Syrian conflict might have an impact on the global scale. The global scale thus, does 
not only relate to the countries in the Middle East already touched upon, but as well other regions of 
the world. 
 
Global Migration Crisis 
As outlined in the Introduction, refugees from the Syrian crisis are currently migrating to Europe in 
large numbers. For these people, the perceived environment of insecurity has expanded to a large 
geographical area, perhaps due to the conflicts they have experienced en route and in their 
temporary places of refuge. Furthermore Europe might represent an environment of high human 
security, as it consists of relatively well-functioning, rich and secure nation-states. There can thus 
be multiple motivations for migrating to Europe, as it represents an opportunity in terms of 
employment, security and the like. Whether or not these refugees will obtain a higher degree of 
human security, highly depends on how they are perceived and received. In the previous analytical 
chapter, Turkey initially sought towards cooperation, thereby trying to create an environment of 
human security; however, they moved towards conflict by resorting to nationalist security concerns. 
Strategies therefore might change over time in reaction to new threats or opportunities.  
There is currently in Europe heavy discussions over the appropriate response towards the influx of 
refugees and migrants. The majority of refugees are taking the route through Turkey into the 
Balkans. As the number of refugees continues to rise in the Balkans, the countries have started to 
close their borders, which is creating a domino effect of borders closing and fences erected (The 
Guardian, 2015a). This is not only happening in the Balkan countries, but also in the rest of Europe. 
Even countries in Northern Europe, such as Sweden are increasing border control (Guardian, 
2015b). As it was the case at the local and regional scale, the European Union can strengthen 
cooperation and integration rather than conflict, control and separation, and the political leaders of 
the EU are meeting regularly in an attempt to do so. Yet, so far the measures taken to ensure a joint 
European solution have been unimpressive and critiques have argued that this crisis might be the 
beginning of the end of the EU (The Telegraph, 2015).  
The powerful nations in the EU have failed to show leadership, and most of the countries are 
resorting to responses based on their own national security concerns, by taking measures to keep the 
“others” out and not aiding their fellow European nations by setting up a collective distribution 
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policy. In prioritizing national security over human security the international system is creating an 
environment of human insecurity for all involved. Furthermore, the European countries are 
resorting to discussion over what “kind” of refugees should be allowed into their countries. There 
are differentiations not only between migrants and refugees, which Sirkeci argues is a “false” 
distinction, but also between where the refugees/migrants originate. Macedonia recently closed their 
borders to everyone except Syrian-, Afghan- and Iraqi refugees, meaning that a lot of Iranians and 
Pakistanis were stranded with no opportunities, and thus faced extreme insecurity. In line with 
Macedonia's actions, the same happened in Serbia and Croatia (Amnesty International, 2015). 
Hence, the differentiation of refugees and the lack of partnership between the European nations are 
creating an environment of human insecurity for a large number of people. Likewise it might also 
hold the potential to create more tensions and conflict, thereby destabilizing good relations between 
nation-states in the EU, as it was in the case of the Turkish-Syrian relationship. Any conclusions 
drawn on this matter would need to be based on a more in-depth analysis of the spillovers between 
places and scales, how threats are perceived and responded to and the relations amongst the nation-
states in this region. Nevertheless, the patterns of migration are the same at any scale. People either 
try to avoid perceived insecurity or seek more security. Likewise, the response can either further 
cooperation or conflict, and if the latter is the case, then people’s sense of security might be 
compromised (cf. Conceptual Framework). 
The Syrian crisis and the migration patterns it has produced is thus an example of how a seemingly 
local phenomenon can spillover to the regional scale but also the global scale if not sufficiently 
managed. Migration due to conflict, environmental changes, loss of livelihood or other insecurities, 
is happening all across the world. There are currently 60 million refugees worldwide, and far more 
could be unregistered (cf. Introduction). Hence in many places and at many different scales, the 
issues handled in this thesis might have an impact, and might represent future challenges for the 
international community. These potential challenges and responses will be examined in the 
following sections, in relation to some of the more contemporary attempts on behalf of the 
international society to address climate change and climate-induced migration. 
 
Climate Refugees and Future Challenges 
It is important to remember that people migrate for a number of reasons. The potential global 
migration crisis is therefore not only one of conflict-induced migration, though it is demanding a lot 
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of attention in mainstream media. As established climate change, in various forms is creating an 
environment of human insecurity in many places and at many scales all across the world thus 
constituting an important layer of conflict. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center estimates 
that 19.3 million people were displaced by natural disasters in 2014 (IDMC, 2015). Furthermore, 
WaterAid states that 650 million people worldwide do not have access to safe water (WaterAid, 
2015). Given water’s importance, as established throughout the thesis, this could pose a great 
insecurity for many people, as it has done in Syria. As such, could the massive immigration from 
Syria over the last couple of years be a sign of things to come?  
Scientists are already observing a global tendency of migration from rural to urban areas, as farmers 
in pre-industrialized societies lose their livelihoods for a variety of reasons (de Châtel, 2014). In 
recent years, in response to the changing environment, as new term has emerged; climate refugee. 
The term describes a person who has either decided or was forced to migrate due to climate change 
impact. However, the term is mostly used in academic circles, and there is no official political 
definition, which means that these people cannot be granted official refugee status, and thus acclaim 
the attached rights and protection. The United Nations has started to push for recognition of climate 
refugees as a legal status, but not much progress has been made (Oels, 2016: 188). 
The international community is thus not equipped to handle the potential climate refugee crisis, as it 
has not developed sufficient terms for the phenomenon and thus neither concrete measures for 
response. The global migration issue, is mostly portrayed as an issue of poor governance and 
conflict in different places across the world, thus as a responsibility of the respective nation-states 
(cf. Conceptual Framework). Climate changes are however challenging this, as it does not fit within 
specific national borders. On the contrary, scholars within environmental security argue that the 
mass-migration caused by climate change is very much a result of the affluent Northern countries 
production and consumption patterns (Dalby, 2009: 159). If they bear part of the responsibility, then 
arguably they should be a part of the solution. As the impact of climate change is becoming more 
apparent, the international society is increasingly recognizing its importance and is thus shifting 
focus towards more collaborative efforts. Whether or not these responses are based on national or 
human security interests, and how it affects the environment of human security is not easily 
answered. The following section aims at outlining recent efforts on behalf of the international 
community to address climate change and thus a partial root cause of much displacement and 
conflict worldwide. 
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Responding to Global Challenges 
In December 2015, representatives from all the nations of the world met to discuss climate change 
at the COP21 meeting in Paris. The meeting ended with the first universal agreement to cut 
greenhouse gas emissions, as an attempt to avoid the most dangerous effects of climate change. 
Many of the participants consider the deal a momentous success. Jennifer Morgan, of the World 
Resources Institute believes that the deal could have a ”transformative” effect on climate discourse 
(Goldenberg et al., 2015). The COP21 agreement thus represents a significant move towards 
cooperation, in relation to Sirkeci’s continuum, at least insofar as it is the first agreements of its 
kind. The hope is that the agreement will ensure that the nation-states start addressing the 
consequences of climate change, and understand how it is a partial root cause in much migration 
and conflict taking place. 
Critics disparage a number of changes made to the deal during the final negotiations, such as the 
removal of language that could be used to claim legal liability for climate change on part of the 
United States and concessions made to Russia, Saudi Arabia and other natural gas producers. 
Furthermore, some critics argue that the agreement abandons many low-lying coastal areas and 
small islands. However many of the deal’s defenders argue that despite continuing negative trends 
from previous deals, it is still a step in the right direction in terms of getting nation-states to address 
climate change collectively (Vidal et al., 2015). The criticism should however be taken seriously. 
The agreement might be a sign of future cooperation but it could be argued that it is not breaking 
with fundamental deficiencies in the international system. Some scholars and commentators have 
argued that no amount of serious progress towards cooperation can be made unless the negotiating 
parties stop reinforcing North-South division and lax non-committal wording (Guardian, 2015c). 
Many of these problems stem from the participating nations doing damage control on the deal, in 
order to make sure it doesn’t harm their own national economy and security, as well as their 
standing in the international community. As such it can be argued that even if the deal is a step in a 
more human security oriented direction, it is still weighed down by national security interests. This 
is not to say that the nation-states should abandon all national security interests but as it has been 
established throughout the thesis, it can have consequences for geopolitical relations between states 
and thus the environment of human security.  
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Furthermore, the COP21 agreement is only a framework for limiting future emissions and not for 
acting on the damage already done to places and people across the world. This is evident in the lack 
of non-committal language in the agreement.  
As stated in the Conceptual Framework, human security is easier to ensure through early prevention 
and as such the agreement can serve to mitigate future impact of climate change. However one 
thing is dealing with the root causes of displacement and conflict, e.g. water scarcity, another is 
dealing with the places already uninhabitable and the people already displaced. The response and 
measures taken on by Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and the European countries to deal with the 
“refugee crisis” is an example of how the links between climate change, displacement and conflict 
is not sufficiently understood and acted upon. Neither are the ways in which these processes operate 
at different scales nor how they intersect.  
 
Sub-conclusion; Water Scarcity, Scales and Security 
The final section will  discuss how water scarcity, security and scales are interlinked. While water 
should not be seen as the root cause of insecurity, it is as outlined throughout the thesis,  a 
significant factor. Water is a fundamental necessity of all life and therefore the lack of it  severely 
limits human activity. Access to water is crucial for human security and the security of the nation-
state which needs to protect and provide for its citizens. As it has been evident in the three analyses, 
the nation-states at both the local, regional and global scale will go to great extents to ensure 
sufficient water supply, even when it has unintended consequences for people in other places. 
Turkey’s attempt to increase its share of water from the Tigris-Euphrates river basin has had 
consequences for the water supply in Syria and Iraq and might have been a contributing factor to 
some of the processes of conflict and insecurity examined in the first analysis. Spillover from Syria 
in turn creates an environment of human insecurity for the Turkish population, as well as 
geopolitical tensions at the regional scale, as the two nation-states fail to take cooperative measures. 
These processes are all interlinked and the effects of the action taken by Turkey or Syria can 
therefore not be isolated to its own scale of operation. In addition tensions related to water access 
are not only occurring in these countries. Jordan is likewise feeling the effect of climate change 
affecting water supply, which is further strained as it intersects with local spillover of people and 
conflict from Syria. The protracted nature of the Syrian crisis, is straining the resources and 
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capacity of the neighboring countries to an extent where national concerns are dictating their 
foreign policy. It is creating an environment of human insecurity, which has in turn motivated or 
forced people to migrate beyond the region, for example through Turkey into Europe. However, the 
European nation-states too are resorting to protection of domestic territory, creating a domino effect 
of border closures. 
National security and the underlying assumptions of political autonomy at the scale of the state, is 
not fit to encompass the geography of environmental changes and human mobility. The focus on 
national security is then not helpful as environmental changes, migration and conflict do not respect 
national borders but operate on multiple scales and in multiple ways. As long as the nation-states of 
the world ignore or fail to address these intersections and resort to national security measures, an 
environment of human security will be difficult to obtain. 
The international community is increasingly recognizing the effect of climate change on people’s 
security and moving towards cooperation. However the COP21 agreement highlights how real 
progress in addressing global processes is hindered by preoccupations with national gains and 
security. Furthermore, mainstream understandings of the links between global climate processes 
handled at the COP21 meeting, and the many refugees across the world are still limited. As such a 
comprehensive and sustainable solution is distant. 
As this thesis has tried to highlight, human security serves as a better framework to grasp the effects 
of water scarcity on the local, regional and global scale. By changing the referent object to the 
individual rather than the state, a better understanding of the threats and possibilities for human 
security is gained. Scales are thus an important tool when examining water-related issues. As it has 
been shown, water is a significant factor in security for both regular people at the local scale, 
national governments and their relations at the regional scale. It might as well have global 
consequences when nation-states across the world fail to take cooperative measures. 
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Conclusion 
The thesis has aimed at answering the following question: 
How does the water scarcity in the Middle-East affect political stability on a local, regional and 
global scale? 
In order to do so, three analytical chapters have been unfolded, each referring to a specific scale and 
each presenting different narratives contributing to a multilayered understanding of the Syrian case 
study. Water has been the common denominator of the migration, tension, conflict and cooperation 
examined in this thesis. It is not the only factor contributing to instability and insecurity, but 
nevertheless an important factor which this thesis argues is often given insufficient attention. 
From the first analysis it was concluded that Syria has experienced a devastating drought. This 
drought was the outcome of climate change, population growth, poor governance on behalf of the 
Syrian authorities and poor transnational cooperation on shared water sources.  
Consequently a large number of people lost their livelihoods and experienced an environment of 
human insecurity. In order to gain more security many migrated from the rural areas, particularly in 
the northeastern part of Syria, towards the major cities. In the places of transit and destination, host 
communities experienced increased pressure on their livelihoods, declining opportunities for 
employment and social support. Moreover, the addition of people to the already dense cities put 
immense strain on the scarce water resources in the country. The Syrian government failed to 
mitigate the increased insecurity for its population and sustained that the water crisis was mostly a 
result of external factors beyond its control. As such the local tensions related to water and 
migration created an environment for opposition and resistance to flourish, which in turn 
contributed to the 2011 uprising. 
However, the Syrian government was not completely wrong in arguing that external factors played 
a part in the crisis. The second analysis examined the water policies between Turkey and Syria, and 
to some extent Iraq, which has historically been contentious as each nation-state pursued national 
security and gains. Despite progress and increased cooperation at the turn of the century, which 
created an environment of relative human security, the good relations did not last. The Syrian civil 
war put a stop to the cooperative water policies and strained the capacities of Turkey to protect both 
the refugee population and its own citizens. While Turkey made attempts at ensuring security and 
stability across national borders in its initial response to the Syrian crisis, it could not keep up its 
68 
 
diplomatic ways. This is partly a result of the country relying on its own capabilities, instead of 
accepting support from other parts of the world. As the Syrian crisis grew more complex and 
involved new non-state actors, Turkey started to use its water sources as a tool in the war against 
violent factions in Syria. In 2014 Turkey completely shut of the flow of water into Syria. Water was 
then used as a vital measure in conducting foreign policy and ensuring national security. 
The regional scale of analysis, thereby shows how spillover of violence and people from the Syrian 
crisis had effects in Turkey, which in turn created responses that impact on Syria and elsewhere in 
the region. Events and processes from the local and regional scale are thus intersecting in ways 
potentially creating an environment of human insecurity for all parties. 
It shows how important scales are in understanding a seemingly local phenomenon. The world is 
interconnected in a manner where processes cannot be isolated to one specific scale. Water scarcity 
is the Middle East is in itself a process operating at multiple scales at once, and the entire region is 
thus affected by diminishing water resources. The conflict and tensions which have unfolded in 
Syria, and to some extent Turkey, due to water scarcity might therefore present a warning to other 
parts of the region.  
In the final analysis, it was highlighted that Jordan is facing a severe water crisis, which is 
exacerbated by spillover of people from the Syrian crisis. As Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and other 
countries fail to mitigate the environment of human insecurity, it only expands and affects more 
people. As such, the migration patterns in the Middle East are starting to have an impact on other 
regions of the world. A great amount of the Syrian refugees have taken the route through Turkey 
into the southern European countries and beyond. However, the nation-states fail to address the 
immigration and its potential threats to political stability in a joint and comprehensive manner, 
consequently creating more insecurity. It is ironic that the measures taken by the European leaders 
to ensure political stability and security are in fact creating its opposite. Attempts are made in the 
international community to address global processes such as climate change collectively, e.g. at the 
recent COP21 conference. However, the potential of the agreement to create more human security, 
is weighed down by individual states trying to maximize their own gains, and avoid binding 
responsibility. Furthermore, the actions of the nation-states, are not guided by a comprehensive 
understanding of how climate change is connected to much of the conflict and migration taken 
place across the world. It might be a result of the mainstream conceptualization of security, which 
still generally sees conflict as a result of poor governance, thus internal factors. By relying on 
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national security measures, the nation-states fail to recognize the interconnected and interdependent 
nature of the modern world. As such, the “global migration crisis”, and its the root cause, cannot be 
solved by one nation-state alone, but needs to be addressed as a common issue affecting all places 
and scales across the world. Human security, arguing for early prevention, changing the referent 
object from the state to the individual and viewing different parts of security as interconnected, is 
then a better framework to deal with the potential political instability caused by water scarcity. 
In conclusion, water scarcity affects political stability in numerous ways, depending on the actions 
taken to mitigate it. The most prominent outcome of water scarcity in the Middle East is loss of 
livelihoods for the most vulnerable people, motivating or forcing them to migrate. Migration causes 
instability and insecurity in route and destination and has put strain on relations between Syria and 
its neighbors, and increasingly in other parts of the world. 
The migration examined in this thesis is caused by a complex mix of social, political, economic and 
environmental patterns and processes. The Syrian civil war is arguably a main cause of migration. 
However, when the civil war ends, the water scarcity in the region persists. Thus people are fleeing 
from processes which are difficult to avoid, in a system that cannot finds way to address them and 
climate change is most likely only going to get worse and affect more people. As such, water 
scarcity, or any other environmental change, can create political instability and insecurity all across 
the world.  
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